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CHINA’S RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW: A PLATFORM FOR
GREEN LEADERSHIP?
JOEL B. EISEN*
We know the country that harnesses the power of clean,
renewable energy will lead the 21st century. And yet, it is
China that has launched the largest effort in history to make
their economy energy-efficient.1
China may soon be simultaneously the greenest and the
blackest place on earth. The country is poised to be at once
the world’s leader in alternative energy—and its leading
emitter of CO2.2
INTRODUCTION
China is making large investments in solar and wind power tech-
nology as a cornerstone of its climate change policy. It has shown that it
can build solar and wind energy farms in a hurry and has exceeded the
targets announced in recent years for new capacity. If it met the even
more audacious goals it has announced for 2020 and beyond, it would be
a world leader in renewable energy. China has extensive regions where
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solar3 and wind4 could generate electricity at low costs. A 2009 study by
researchers from Harvard and Tsinghua universities concluded that wind
power could accommodate all of the increased demand for electricity pro-
jected for 2030 in China.5 As Secretary of Energy Steven Chu testified
before the Senate in 2009, “China has already made its choice. China is
spending about $9 billion a month on clean energy.”6 In 2008, the Chinese
government invested 3.8 billion RMB (approximately $560 million) in
green technology, representing an annual growth of over twenty percent.7
By 2009, China overtook the United States in annual spending on renew-
ables, although it still remained behind in terms of total installed capacity.8
Chinese firms are both greentech makers and overseas investors.9 In 2009,
3 ALEXANDRA KRAVETZ, GREEN CROSS INT’L, 2008 GLOBAL SOLAR REPORT CARDS 32 (2008),
available at http://www.globalgreen.org/docs/publication-96-1.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010)
(“An estimated 2/3rds of the country receives solar radiation in excess of 4.6 kWh/m2/day.
China’s annual solar power potential has been estimated to be 19,536,000 TWh. Capturing
1% of this resource, and utilizing it with 15% efficiency, could supply as much electricity
as the whole world currently consumes in 18 months.”) (quoting WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL,
2007 SURVEY OF ENERGY RESOURCES 402 (2007)).
4 Peter Fairley, China’s Potent Wind Potential, TECH. REV. (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www
.technologyreview.com/energy/23460/page1 (“[There are] extensive regions where [wind
power] can be generated at costs similar to the government-set energy rates earned by
established wind farms, which range from 0.38 to 0.55 Chinese yuan (6 cents to 8 cents)
per kilowatt-hour (kWh).”).
5 Michael B. McElroy et al., Potential for Wind-Generated Electricity in China, 325
SCIENCE 1378, 1379 (2009); Fairley, supra note 4 (discussing the study and noting that
“wind-farm operators could profitably generate 6.96 trillion kWh of wind energy—more
than double China’s annual power consumption of 3.4 trillion kWh and comparable to the
projected total demand by 2030”); a recent comprehensive GIS analysis of wind power’s
potential for China confirms this result, yielding an astonishing total of 13,227 GW of
possible generation. ENERGY FOUNDATION, CHINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY PROGRAM, WIND
GIS ANALYSIS FOR CHINA 6 (2009), available at http://www.efchina.org/FReports.do?act
=detail&id=277.
6 Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act: Hearing on S. 1733 Before the S. Comm.
on Env’t and Pub. Works, 111th Congress (2009) (statement of Steven Chu, Secretary of
Energy).
7 New Energy Industry Highlight of Post-Crisis Economy, ENERGY CHINA FORUM (Oct. 30,
2009), http://energychinaforum.com/news/27651.shtml. Chinese currency is called Renminbi
(“RMB”). See General Information of Chinese Currency RMB, CHINA TODAY, http://www
.chinatoday.com/fin/mon (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
8 Simon Rogers, How China Overtook the US in Renewable Energy, GUARDIAN.CO.UK
(Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/mar/25/china-renewable
-energy-pew-research (table showing that China spent $34.6 billion to the United States’
$18.6 billion in 2009).
9 Wind Investment in Texas Shows China’s Clout in Field, ENERGY CHINA FORUM (Nov. 2,
2009), http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/27703.shtml [hereinafter Wind Investment
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the China-based Shenyang Power Group announced a $1.5 billion joint ven-
ture to develop a 36,000-acre wind farm in Texas with the U.S. Renewable
Energy Group and Austin-based Cielo Wind Power.10
To the casual observer, it must seem that China is leaping far
ahead of the rest of the world in deploying green technology, and hardly
a week goes by without some American alluding to a new greentech “arms
race” with the Chinese.11 No less a towering environmental figure in the
United States than Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. has stated, “the Chinese are
treating the energy technology competition as if it were an arms race.”12
At times, this commentary is meant to prod policymakers in the United
States to move more quickly to promote renewables than we have done in
recent years.13 We have struggled for nearly a decade to develop one off-
shore wind farm, which, ironically, Kennedy himself opposed.14 It is easy
to contrast our laggardly pace with that of China, which has come so far
in a short time. At other times, however, the rhetoric about China and
greentech seems as simplistic and overheated as the pervasive claims in
the 1980s that Japan was going to dominate the world’s manufacturing
sector.15 We know how (not so) well that prediction turned out.16
in Texas]; Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., The New Arms Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19,
2009), http://huffingtonpost.com/robert-f-kennedy-jr/the-new-arms-race_b_364211.html
(“China’s investments in solar technology have so powerfully stimulated the growth of
a Chinese solar market that Chinese solar panel manufacturers now far outnumber
American ones . . . .”).
10 Wind Investment in Texas, supra note 9. See infra notes 372-75 and accompanying text
(discussing criticism of this project in the United States).
11 See, e.g., Bruce Usher, Red China, Green China, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A27,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/opinion/07Usher.html (observing that
“[b]y giving China more time to develop its capacity while neglecting our own, America
is not just losing the clean-tech race, it’s forfeiting it”).
12 Kennedy, Jr., supra note 9.
13 Id. (“We can only prevail with robust investment in and support of U.S.-based greentech
innovation.”).
14 Dan Honan, Robert F. Kennedy Jr Stands Firm in His Opposition to Cape Wind,
NANTUCKET INSIDER BLOG (May 12, 2010), http://plumtv.com/blogs/nantucket-insider/
robert-f-kennedy-jr-stands-firm-in-his-opposition-to-cape-wind.
15 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/business/
energy-environment/31renew.html (“[China’s] efforts to dominate renewable energy tech-
nologies raise the prospect that the West may someday trade its dependence on oil from
the Mideast for a reliance on solar panels, wind turbines and other gear manufactured
in China.”).
16 Both the overheated rhetoric about Japanese prowess and the subsequent economic
troubles that undercut it are chronicled ably in RICHARD KATZ, JAPAN: THE SYSTEM THAT
SOURED: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC MIRACLE (1998). For example,
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As this rhetoric suggests, much of what passes for analysis on
China’s push to develop renewables is short-sighted and reductionist. This
should surprise no one who is familiar with one of the world’s least open
societies. China’s national government features a dense bureaucracy
with redundant and overlapping agencies that are perpetually reshuffled
in complex reorganizations.17 The Chinese Communist Party controls the
central government, and its closed nature makes it hard for the outside
observer to evaluate governmental actions.18 Add in a lack of documents
translated into English, and a fair amount of guesswork becomes required
just to discern what is taking place. A perennial problem is government
vaporware.19 Announcements often omit important details about how laws
and programs will be implemented20 or promise programs and initiatives
that are delayed or never see the light of day.21
It is exceedingly tempting to descend into stereotyping about a
monolithic “Red Menace” aiming to dominate the world’s economy. Of
course, some do see China’s growth in renewables as a threat.22 Many
Western commentators focus on the growth of China’s greentech manufac-
turing sector and its potential impact on trade.23 Protectionism in China’s
domestic greentech industries is a continuing concern, and, as I discuss
below, it has led to claims, as most prominently made in a recent investi-
gation commenced by the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”),
that multinational companies face obstacles to cracking the Chinese mar-
ket.24 Some Western observers also see Chinese firms as competition at
refer to excerpts from Chapter One. Id. at ch. 1, available at http://www.businessweek
.com/chapter/katz.htm.
17 See infra notes 127–39 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 109–21 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 306–08 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., infra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing the national fund for renew-
able energy R&D); infra notes 228–33 and accompanying text (discussing the Golden Sun
solar subsidy program).
21 One of many examples of this is the announcement of a solar feed-in tariff in 2009, which
as of mid-2010 was not forthcoming. See infra notes 306–08 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, The New Sputnik, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at WK 12,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/opinion/27friedman.html.
23 See, e.g., Christina Larson, Are America’s Fears of a Greentech Race with China
Unfounded?, GREEN ECON. POST (Feb. 22, 2010), http://greeneconomypost.com/us-greentech
-race-with-china-8167.htm [hereinafter Larson, Fears of a Greentech Race] (stating that
“[t]he first essential fact to be aware of is that most news stories about China’s greentech
gains are about manufacturing”).
24 Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the
President, United States Launches Section 301 Investigation into China’s Policies
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home, focusing on potential imports of Chinese technology into the United
States at the expense of domestic companies and the economy.25 This
important subject is worth a full treatment in its own right, as it is inex-
tricably bound up in a much broader discussion about multilateral trade
relations. I will touch upon it briefly in this article.
For now, it is worth noting that growth in China’s renewable power
sector need not be viewed as a zero-sum game. Precisely the opposite may
well be true. Chinese and Western companies have begun to collaborate
in ways that might lead to explosive and sustained growth in both nations’
greentech industries,26 which shows that the realities of the economic
relationship between the United States and China are much more complex
than they are often made out to be. Similarly, I contend in this article that
continued expansion of renewable energy in China is complex because it
faces substantial technical and legal challenges similar in some respects
to those faced in the United States. I will embark on an in-depth analysis
of those challenges, set against the legal, political, and financial environ-
ment for renewable energy deployment in China.
Beginning with China’s governmental structure, I note that its
unique characteristics pose special challenges for increasing the deploy-
ment of renewable energy. There are some similarities with renewable
energy laws and policies elsewhere. China has legal mechanisms compa-
rable to those of the United States and Europe to encourage renewable
Affecting Trade and Investment in Green Technologies (Oct. 15, 2010) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/node/6223 [hereinafter United States Trade Representative].
25 See infra notes 375–76 and accompanying text (discussing objections to the joint venture
wind power project proposed in Texas).
26 Larson, Fears of a Greentech Race, supra note 23 (quoting Shanghai-based American
entrepreneur Richard Brubaker’s statement that “[t]he clean-tech war is overblown from
the start” and observing that “the green-tech ‘race’ is not one that one side wins and the
other loses, but a scenario where partnerships are sought out and the final equation doesn’t
have to be a zero-sum game”); see also Joined at the Hip: The US-China Clean Energy
Relationship, COMMODITIES NOW (May 19, 2010), http://www.commodities-now.com/news/
environmental-markets/2782-joined-at-the-hip-us-china-clean-energy-relationship.html
(comments of Michael Liebreich, CEO of Bloomberg New Energy Finance):
It is easy to paint clean energy trade between the US and China in terms
of winners and losers, but the relationship defies simplistic assump-
tions[.] For instance, while China has made significant inroads into the
US photovoltaic market, Chinese modules are often manufactured using
machines designed by US firms. Similarly, US made wind turbines
almost always contain parts sourced from China. The two nations may
be in competition, but the big win for both of them would be to drive the
cost of a clean power generation below the cost of fossil fuels.
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energy, including a strong Renewable Energy Law,27 government plans,28
regulations,29 and aggressive mandates.30 As with much about modern
China, however, one must look beyond tough, apparently rigid words on
paper to see a process that appears much more like ongoing policy experi-
mentation. In particular, several recent reorganizations of governmental
bodies responsible for energy policy-making have failed to create a stream-
lined structure of decision-making authority.31 The top-down nature of
China’s communist government also creates ongoing difficulties in trans-
lating national commands into action in China’s provinces.32
Substantial technical and financial challenges also lie ahead. China
is increasing its deployment of solar and wind power but must do more to
connect new plants to the electricity grid and must upgrade its transmis-
sion infrastructure to handle the increased load from both conventional
fossil-fuel plants and new renewable generation.33 While the Renewable
Energy Law requires that China’s grid companies purchase power from
renewable power generators, the available evidence suggests that there
has been some resistance to this mandate.34 Recent amendments to the
Renewable Energy Law create a stronger purchase obligation and may
lessen this problem.35 The pricing structure for purchased power has been
inconsistent, leading to criticism from China’s renewable power industry.36
27 Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l Peoples Cong., Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), ST. COUNCIL GAZ. Issue
11, Serial No. 1154 (China), translated at http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/en/NewsInfo.asp
?NewsId=5371 [hereinafter REL 2006], amended by Decision of the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress on Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of China
on Renewable Energy (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26,
2009, effective Apr. 1, 2010), 2009 China Law LEXIS 671 (China) [hereinafter Amended
REL 2009].
28 China’s Energy Conditions and Policies (promulgated by the Information Office of the
St. Council, Dec. 26, 2007, effective Dec. 26, 2007), available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/
policyrelease/P020071227502260511798.pdf (China).
29 See Amended REL 2009, supra note 27; see also REL 2006, supra note 27.
30 See Amended REL 2009, supra note 27.
31 See Michael Meidan et al., Shaping China’s Energy Policy: Actors and Processes, 18 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA 591, 592–607 (2009).
32 See, e.g., Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of
Enforcement, and Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVT. L. & POL’Y 267, 309–11 (2007).
33 See Jing Yang, China’s Wind Farms Come with a Catch: Coal Plants, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 28, 2009, at A17; see also Larson, supra note 2.
34 Sitaraman, supra note 32, at 309–11.
35 See Amended REL 2009, supra note 27.
36 See infra Part VI.B.
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 Here too, through a process of policy experimentation, China may
create a more stable investment climate for the industry.
Will China become the world’s leader in renewable power genera-
tion? That remains to be seen.
I. RENEWABLES AS A “GREEN” TO CHINA’S “BLACK”
As the quote that begins this article observes, China’s environ-
mental problems are severe and growing.37 It continues to struggle with
poor air and water quality,38 and it is a primary contributor to global
warming.39 China’s share of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions has in-
creased dramatically in recent years, and it is now the largest emitter of
GHGs in the world.40 The electric power sector creates approximately
thirty percent of China’s GHG emissions,41 as over seventy percent of
China’s electricity is still generated from coal, a major source of carbon
dioxide emissions.42 China’s coal production has more than doubled since
37 See Larson, supra note 2.
38 Id.
39 See Keith Bradsher, China Fears Warming Effects of a Rising Consumer Class, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2010, at A1.
40 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0384(2008) ANNUAL ENERGY
REVIEW 2008, at 343 (2009), available at http://www.eia.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/038408
.pdf (stating that in 2006, China emitted 6,018 million metric tons (“MMT”) of carbon
dioxide (“CO2”) to the United States’ 5,903 MMT); see also MCKINSEY & CO., CHINA’S GREEN
REVOLUTION: PRIORITIZING TECHNOLOGIES TO ACHIEVE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY 29 (2009), http://www.mckinsey.com/locations/greaterchina/mckonchina/
reports/china_green_revolution.aspx. While China’s total GHG emissions have surpassed
those of the United States, China’s emissions are still lower on a per capita basis, and
China sought to exploit that fact in international climate negotiations. See News Release,
Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Position on the
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (May 20, 2009), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn (follow
“China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (2009-05-21)” hyperlink)
(stating the Chinese negotiation position that “[d]eveloped countries shall take respon-
sibility for their historical cumulative emissions and current high per capita emissions
to change their unsustainable way of life and to substantially reduce their emissions”).
41 MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 40, at 10 (chart showing that in 2005, China’s power sector
was responsible for 2.0 gigatons of CO2 equivalent emissions out of a total of 6.8 gigatons).
42 Lin Liyu, China’s Power Generation Goes Greener with Total Capacity Up 10%, CHINA
VIEW (Jan. 7, 2010, 5:35 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/07/content
_12771880.htm (coal-fired power accounted for 74.6 percent of the nation’s 874 million
kilowatts of electricity generation capacity in 2009); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, INDEPENDENT STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS:
CHINA 13 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/pdf.pdf [hereinafter EIA
CHINA BRIEF] (stating that “[c]oal makes up 70 percent of China’s total primary energy
consumption”).
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2000 to approximately three billion tons in 2008, making it one of the
world’s largest coal burners.43 China’s coal consumption makes up forty
percent of the entire global total,44 and this staggering number is likely
to increase. As its standard of living improves, the nation’s appetite for
power is growing. According to one report, China needs to quadruple the
amount of power generated in 2005 to meet its projected needs in 2030.45
Given this reality, even exceptional progress on the green front will do
little more than slow down China’s trend toward increasing carbon emis-
sions.46 By one estimate, simply holding the increase in 2005 GHG emis-
sions to ten percent by 2030 (fifty percent lower than currently projected
emissions) would require China to generate eight percent of its power from
solar technology.47
Taking action now is therefore vital. If China does not do more to
address climate change, it will not matter whether the rest of the world
pursues emissions-reduction strategies.48 Two compelling comprehensive
studies in 2009 showed that it would take very aggressive measures to
slow or reverse the growth in China’s GHG emissions.49 The tall challenge
43 EIA CHINA BRIEF, supra note 42, at 13 (noting that “[i]n 2008, China consumed an esti-
mated three billion short tons of coal, representing nearly 40 percent of the world total
and a 129 percent increase since 2000”).
44 Id.
45 See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 40, at 37 (noting an increased demand for energy
without any demand-reducing measures); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010: HIGHLIGHTS (2010), available at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/highlights.pdf (noting that according to projections, “[t]he
most rapid growth in energy demand from 2007 to 2035 occurs in nations outside the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development”).
46 A good quick take on this issue featuring recent data can be found in Ann Carlson,
China’s Growth in Energy Usage Truly Alarming, LEGAL PLANET (May 7, 2010), http://
legalplanet.wordpress.com/2010/05/07/chinas-growth-in-energy-usage-truly-alarming.
47 See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 40, at 11–13.
48 As one long-time observer of China puts it, “China is on track to overwhelm the global
effort to address climate change.” Challenges and Opportunities for U.S.-China Cooperation
on Climate Change: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 16
(2009) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Elizabeth Economy, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow
and Director for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations).
49 These studies were performed by the McKinsey consulting firm and the United Kingdom’s
Tyndall Centre. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 40; TAO WANG & JIM WATSON, TYNDALL
CENTRE FOR CLIMATE RESEARCH, CHINA’S ENERGY TRANSITION: PATHWAYS FOR LOW
CARBON DEVELOPMENT 3–5 (2009), http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sussexenergygroup/documents/
china_report_forweb.pdf.
Charles McElwee, in his discussion of the McKinsey study, summarized a conclusion
that “if China continues to grow at an annual GDP growth rate of 7.8%,” and it took a
number of GHG-reducing measures it had already announced, “it will more than double
its 2005 carbon emissions by 2030. (6.8 Gigatons of CO2e vs.14.5 Gigatons of CO2e).”
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of addressing China’s GHG emissions growth is complicated by rapid
economic development and the correspondingly rapid rate of increase in
GHG emissions,50 a political system that continues to give incentives for
growth over environmental protection,51 and a still nascent environmental
monitoring and enforcement system.52 It is also unlikely that China will
agree to any new international climate agreement that caps its emissions.53
China intends to take emissions reducing measures without agreeing to a
cap.54 China’s President, Hu Jintao, stated in November 2009 that China’s
Charles McElwee, 2050!?, CHINA ENVTL. L. (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.chinaenvironmental
law.com/2009/08/17/2050.
50 Edward Wong & Keith Bradsher, China Proposes a Plan to Slow Greenhouse Gas,
Follows Offer by U.S.: Beijing’s Strategy Falls Short of Reductions Others Sought, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at A1.
51 Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements, Internal Heterogeneity,
and Climate Change: The “Two Chinas” Problem, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 325, 351 (2010)
(discussing the Chinese government’s emphasis on economic growth through performance
evaluations of local government officials).
52 See id. at 352 (discussing the Chinese government’s difficulties in monitoring environ-
mental compliance).
53 Id. at 356–57 (discussing reasons why China may refuse to sign an international climate
agreement).
54 In May 2009, China demanded that “developed countries as a whole . . . reduce their
GHG emissions by at least 40% below their 1990 level by 2020,” and stated that China
and other developing countries need not meet emissions targets but instead should only
“take proactive measures to adapt to and mitigate climate change.” Nat’l Dev. & Reform
Comm’n, supra note 40. China sees its role as different from that of developed nations
due to the historical differences between them:
There’s a difference between the United States position on how China
should address climate change, and China’s position on what it should
do. It’s been repeated many times, but the controversy surrounding
historical vs. current emissions and gross vs. per capita emissions re-
mains. Depending on how you read the numbers, China can either look
really good or really bad. Also, there’s the debate about whether China
is a developed or a developing country. So, I think the challenges and
the opportunities stem from that difference in stance. The US seems to
believe that China should be doing as much as the US. China has indi-
cated that—at least in this round of negotiations—no cap on emissions
will be committed to.
China’s Energy, China’s Power: An Interview with China Energy Specialists, Elizabeth
Balkan and Chris Brown, AIMEE BARNES (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.aimeebarnes.com/
2009/10/19.
The “Copenhagen Accord” reached in December 2009 did not impose emissions caps
on any nations. See John Vidal et al., Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends
in Failure, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 19, 2009, 12:47 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal. Following the Copenhagen summit, China
avoided the term “associated with,” but gave qualified approval to the Copenhagen Accord.
Arthur Max, China, India Join Copenhagen Accord, Last Major Emitters to Sign On,
10 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:1
next five-year plan for development would include a new goal to reduce
“carbon intensity” (CO2 emissions per unit of gross domestic product) from
2005 levels by forty percent by 2020.55
The range of measures that China has taken to meet this goal is
“vast,”56 and includes a national government commitment to renewable
energy.57 The National Development and Reform Commission’s (“NDRC”)
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2010 2:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/09/
china-india-join-copenhag_n_491640.html. At the same time, its Premier, Wen Jiaboa,
rejected the notion among some nations that the Accord was a platform for further nego-
tiations toward binding emissions caps, stating “ ‘it is neither viable nor acceptable to start
a new negotiating process’ outside the framework of previous U.N. treaties.” Id. (quoting
Chinese Premier Wen Jiaboa).
55 Edward Wong & Keith Bradsher, China Joins U.S. in Pledge of Hard Targets on
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A1. Because the carbon intensity measures how
much carbon it takes to produce a unit of economic output, “emissions would still increase,
though the rate would slow.” Id.
In mid-2010, there was also talk that China would impose a carbon tax as a means
of reducing emissions, although that was “hardly a done deal.” Deborah Seligsohn, New
Approaches to Climate Action in China: China Considers Carbon Tax Proposals, CHINA
FAQS (May 14, 2010), http://www.chinafaqs.org/blog-posts/new-approaches-climate-action
-china-china-considers-carbon-tax-proposals.
56 Hearings, supra note 48.
57 Hearings, supra note 48, listing the following:
[r]educing energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP) by
20 percent during 2006–2010; increasing the role of renewable energy
within the primary energy mix to 10 percent by 2010 and 15 percent by
2020; a top 1,000 program to improve the energy efficiency of the top
1,000 energy consuming enterprises in nine sectors (iron and steel, non-
ferrous metal, chemicals, petroleum/petrochemicals, construction material,
textiles, paper, coal mining and power generation); a fuel consumption
tax on gasoline of 1 rmb per litre; replacing and adding to the country’s
stock of coal-fired power plants with more efficient models; and a mas-
sive afforestation program that has raised the level of forest coverage
in the country from approximately 12 percent in 1998 to 18 percent in
2009.
(Emphasis added); see also Charles McElwee, China and the US, Live Debate, ECONOMIST
(Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/421 (“China has already
undertaken a number of actions to promote energy security and improve industrial effi-
ciency, such as increasing the amount of renewable energy in its generation mix. . . . It
repackaged these efforts and deemed them part of its climate change mitigation strategy.”);
Julian Wong & Andrew Light, China Begins Its Transition to a Clean-Energy Economy,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 4, 2009), http:/www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/
china_energy_numbers.html (containing an excellent list of the measures underway to
address climate change in China). See generally PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION MEASURES IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2007),
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/International%20Brief%20-%20China.pdf.
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2007 “National Climate Change Programme”58 and the 2008 “White
Paper”59 contain specific commitments to renewable energy to help miti-
gate climate change impacts.60 Toward that end, the NDRC’s 2007 Medium
and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China (“2007
Plan”)61 aims to satisfy fifteen percent of total primary energy consump-
tion by 2020 with renewables.62
China’s commitment to renewable energy extends to the transmis-
sion infrastructure needed to support it, in marked contrast to the slow
progress of the United States in developing new transmission capacity.63
As Secretary Chu noted, China is
investing $44 billion by 2012 and $88 billion by 2020 in
ultra-high-voltage transmission lines. These lines will allow
China to transmit power from huge wind and solar farms
58 China’s Nat’l Climate Change Programme (issued by the Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n
of the People’s Republic of China, June 2007) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Issue 20, Serial Number
1235, 30–36, available at http:/www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File188.pdf
[hereinafter Nat’l Climate Change Programme].
59 White Paper on China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (issued
by the Info. Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Oct. 29, 2008)
translated at http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-10/29/content_1134544.htm.
60 See, e.g., Nat’l Climate Change Programme, supra note 58, at 31:
Implement the Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China
in a comprehensive manner. Develop supportive regulations and policies,
prepare national and local programs for renewable energy development,
identify development objectives and integrate renewable energy develop-
ment into assessment indicator systems for the construction of resource-
conservative and environmentally-friendly society. Through legislation
and other approaches, domestic and international economic entities will
be guided and encouraged to participate in renewable energy develop-
ment and utilization, and clean energy development will be pursued.
61 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China (issued
by the Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n of the People’s Republic of China, Sept. 2007)
4–6, available at http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/pdf/REDGTF/4th_meeting/China-
_Medium _and_Long-Term_Development_Plan.pdf [hereinafter Medium and Long-Term
Development Plan].
In addition to this translation, American environmental lawyer Charles McElwee,
author of the popular blog China Environmental Law, maintains an English version of
the 2007 Plan and many other important Chinese government documents on the blog
website. See Charles McElwee, CHINA ENVTL. L., http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
62 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan, supra note 61, at 5.
63 See generally BOSSELMAN, EISEN, ROSSI, SPENCE & WEAVER, ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 11 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing obstacles to increasing investment in
transmission in the United States).
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far from its cities. While every country’s transmission needs
are different, this is a clear sign of China’s commitment to
developing renewable energy.64
Upgrading the existing transmission infrastructure is an important ele-
ment of China’s ability to continue to grow its renewable energy sector,
and I will discuss it in more detail below.
II. CURRENT LANDSCAPE FOR NON-HYDRO RENEWABLES IN CHINA
As in the United States, renewables other than hydroelectric power
currently account for only a small percentage of total electric generation
in China.65 At present, the major renewable energy source in China is
hydropower.66 The controversial Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River
in Hubei province is the world’s largest hydroelectric power station, with
a projected total capacity of 22.5 gigawatts (“GW”) when it is fully opera-
tional in 2011.67 In 2008, according to data from the China Electricity
Council, 586.7 terawatt-hours (“TWh”) of electricity were generated from
renewables in China.68 While this accounted for seventeen percent of
national power production,69 that figure is somewhat misleading. The vast
majority of the total (563.3 TWh) came from large and small hydroelectric
power projects, with the remaining 22.0 TWh generated from wind, solar,
and other renewables.70
The second largest source of renewable electric power in China is
wind power, with 12.8 TWh generated in 2008.71 China’s installed wind
capacity has skyrocketed from a mere 400 megawatts (“MW”) in 200172
64 Chu, supra note 6. See infra notes 274–90 and accompanying text for a discussion of
China’s efforts to upgrade its transmission infrastructure.
65 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES IN CHINA 7 (2009),
http://www.ren21.net/pdf/Recommendations_for_RE_Policies_in_China.pdf [hereinafter
RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY]; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE-EIA-
0226(2010/09), ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY: September 2010, at 14 (2010).
66 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 6–7.
67 EIA CHINA BRIEF, supra note 42, at 16. For a description of electricity units of measure-
ment, see Electric Conversions, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www
.eia.doe.gov/electricity/page/prim2/charts.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
68 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 7. A terawatt is a unit of power equal to
one trillion watts, or one million MW. Id. at 163.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Zheng Yisheng et al., Rural Energy Policy in China, CHINA ACAD. OF SOC. SCI. 14 (2009),
available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/3920/ZHENG_paper.pdf.
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to 1.25 GW in 2005 and 12 GW in 2008,73 which at the time represented
9.9% of the entire world total of wind power capacity.74 New wind power
projects in China are both off-grid and grid-connected, and with 200 MW
of capacity installed at the end of 2008, small off-grid wind turbines are
a small but growing source of power in China.75 In contrast to the United
States, where the Cape Wind project in Nantucket Sound off Massachusetts
has faced one delay after another for nearly a decade,76 offshore wind is
off to a fast start in China. As recently as mid-2009, a Chinese observer
noted that “[a]t present, offshore wind power in China is still at the explor-
atory demonstration phase lacking of practical experience.”77 One year
later, the 34-turbine, 102 MW Shanghai Donghaiqiao (“East Sea Bridge”)
project was installed and expected to be in full operation later in 2010.78
Several more offshore wind farms were planned for the near term, bringing
expected near-term capacity additions to one GW,79 more than twice
Cape Wind’s size.80
If the rapid rate of installed wind power capacity to date is not
impressive enough, the nation’s future plans for wind are breathtaking.
China plans to build seven wind power “mega projects” with a minimum
capacity of ten GW each by 2020 in Gansu, Hebei, Jilin, Jiangsu, Xinjiang,
and Inner Mongolia provinces.81 These projects would bring the nation’s
wind power capacity to approximately 120 GW,82 or about seventy-five
73 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 8.
74 See Wind is a Global Power Source, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL (2009), http://www
.gwec.net/index.php?id=13 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (showing total wind power capacity
of the world to be 120.798 GW).
75 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 8.
76 See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 856–62 for a timeline and discussion of the state,
local, and federal regulatory environment for the Cape Wind project from its inception
through early 2010.
77 He Dexin, Wind Energy Development in China, CHINESE WIND ENERGY ASS’N 43
(July 9, 2009), available at http://www.aka.fi/Tiedostot/Tiedostot/ENERGIA/Sino-Finnish
%20seminar/H-Dexin_China.pdf.
78 China Launches Its First Offshore Wind Farm, ENERGY CHINA FORUM (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/32098.shtml.
79 Jeremy Hsu, China Powering Up First Offshore Wind Farm, POPULAR SCI. (Apr. 5, 2010),
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-04/chinas-first-offshore-wind-farm-powering.
80 America’s First Offshore Wind Farm on Nantucket Sound, CAPE WIND ASSOC., http://
www.capewind.org/article24.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (stating that Cape Wind would
generate up to 420 MW of power).
81 Dexin, supra note 77, at 52.
82 Christian Zeppezauer & Connie Carnabuci, A New Revolution: China Hikes Wind and
Solar Power Targets, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD INT’L MAGAZINE (Oct. 9, 2009), available
at http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/10/a-new-revolution-china
-hikes-wind-and-solar-power-targets.
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percent of current world capacity.83 A ten GW wind farm in Jiuquan,
Gansu province, nicknamed “Three Gorges On the Land,” received ap-
proval from the NDRC in April 2008.84 This project in the Gobi Desert is
planned to become a valuable resource for wind power.85 Some experts
also predict that offshore wind might produce as much as thirty GW of
added generation by 2020.86
Current installed wind power capacity is still a small part of
China’s electric power generation sector, which more than doubled from
319 GW in 2000 to 792 GW in 2008 at a rate of twelve percent annually.87
Moreover, wind capacity figures from China must be taken with a grain
of salt. Wind power accounts for a smaller share of total generation than
its share of installed capacity.88 There are many reasons for this. Wind
power installations put out less power than their rated capacity due to the
intermittency of wind and other factors.89 Historically, Chinese installa-
tions have not matched the performance of wind power installations
elsewhere.90 As one report notes, “[i]n 2006 and 2007, China’s average
capacity factor for wind was 0.16, whereas average capacity factors in
OECD countries are typically between 0.20 and 0.30.”91 One article
83 In 2009, total worldwide installed wind power capacity was 159.2 GW. WORLD WIND
ENERGY ASS’N, WORLD WIND ENERGY REPT. 2009, at 9 (2010), available at http://www
.wwindea.org/home/.
84 Lu Zhenhua, Wind Power Growth in China’s Deserts Ignored Financial Risks,
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (May 14, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/
14/wind-power-china-desert; Sinoma Started Wind Blade Project in Jiuquan, Gansu
Province, CHINA WIND POWER NEWSLETTER (Trade Council of Den., Beijing, China), April
2009, at 10, available at http://www.windpower.org/download/409/China_Wind_Power
_Newsletter_2009.pdf.
85 Zhenhua, supra note 84.
86 See Hsu, supra note 79.
87 Dadi Zhou, The Process of Sustainable Energy Development in China, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L. PEACE (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23482.
88 Li Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma: Money Blows Away, CAIJING.COM.CN (Nov. 12, 2009),
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-11-12/110310419.html [hereinafter Qiyan, Wind Power
Dilemma] (stating that wind power makes up 0.45 % of actual generation in China, while
its share of total installed capacity is 1.15 %).
89 The Cape Wind project, for example, is expected to average 170 MW of wind power pro-
duced, compared to 468 MW of installed capacity. Frequently Asked Questions, CAPE WIND,
http://www.capewind.org/FAQ-Category4-Cape+Wind+Basics-Parent0-myfaq-yes.htm
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
90 James H. Williams & Fredrich Kahrl, Electricity Reform and Sustainable Development
in China, 6 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 3, 6 (2008).
91 Id. (calling this a “disturbing trend”). A “capacity factor” is a ratio that compares “a
plant’s actual production over a given period of time with the amount of power the plant
would have produced if it had run at full capacity for the same amount of time,” that is,
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attributes this relatively low output figure to a legacy of protectionism
in China’s wind turbine industry and a lesser quality of domestically
manufactured turbines until very recently.92 As discussed below, China’s
wind power installations also experience problems with grid connections
that reduce their availability to generate power.93
The next largest source of power generated from renewables is
solar power.94 Solar’s share of electricity generation is increasing from a
low base.95 In 2005, total installed capacity of solar photovoltaic (“PV”)
power in China was about seventy MW, most of which supplied power to
remote rural areas.96 These areas, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, are rich in
solar energy resources and represent a huge potential market for solar
energy production.97 Also, the Chinese government has sought for over a
decade to use solar technology to help electrify the seven million households
(30 million people) in rural China that have no access to electricity.98
China has had projects in place since 1998 for construction of
desert power plants and rooftop PV systems connected to the grid.99 In
recent years, China has been moving forward much more aggressively
with deployment of solar technology. The NDRC’s 2007 Plan articulated
a goal for the total capacity of solar power in China of 300 MW by 2010,
and a 2020 goal of 1.8 GW, more than 25 times the 2005 total.100 Recent
reports indicated that the National Energy Administration has increased
these targets to even more ambitious levels, with a two GW target for 2011
the percentage of total possible output that the plant actually generates. See Wind Web
Tutorial, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/faq/wwt_basics.html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2010). For example, a plant with a rated (nameplate) capacity of 600 MW that
produces 300 MW of electricity per hour has a capacity factor of 0.50.
92 Richard Lim et al., Winds of Change: How China’s Government Supports Domestic
Wind Energy Providers, KELLOGG SCH. OF MGMT., NORTHWESTERN U. (Oct. 1, 2009),
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/Departments/International/InternationalFocus/
Article/Winds_of_Change.aspx. See infra notes 369–70 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this issue.
93 This is illustrated graphically in Fairley, supra note 4 (“[p]otential output of 1.5 MW
wind turbines is shown as a percentage of maximum output over time”) showing lower
capacity figures typically for projects located at greater distances from cities.
94 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 7.
95 Id. at 10.
96 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan, supra note 61, at 3.
97 See KRAVETZ, supra note 3, at 32.
98 See generally Michael Davidson, Alternative Energy in China’s Rural Development
Strategy, Presentation to Beijing Energy and Environment Roundtable (BEER) (Oct. 28,
2009) (on file with author).
99 Id.
100 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan, supra note 61, at 3, 9.
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of installed solar PV and a new 2020 target of twenty GW.101 To put this
number in perspective, the installed solar thermal and PV capacity in the
United States in 2008 was 539 MW, a fraction of the Chinese target.102
The American company First Solar announced plans in 2009 to develop
the world’s largest solar plant in China, with a breathtaking capacity of
two GW.103 The First Solar project would be built in four phases over a
twenty-five square-mile area near Ordos in Inner Mongolia, with project
completion expected in 2019.104
China also makes very broad use of residential solar water heaters.
Installed capacity reached 135 million square meters by the end of 2008.105
Ten percent of all Chinese households have solar hot water heaters (for
a total of 40 million installed units), which according to one estimate made
up two-thirds of all the solar water heaters in the world.106 Improvements
in technology have made these units more cost-competitive in recent
years,107 and China plans for an astonishing thirty percent of its house-
holds to have installed heaters by 2020.108
III. OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AND ENTITIES RESPONSIBLE
FOR RENEWABLES LAW AND POLICY
China’s commitment to renewable energy includes substantial
governmental laws, policies, and incentives promoting renewables.109 The
process of developing these laws is different in China than in Western
democratic republics in which state, provincial, or local governments have
substantial policy development roles.110 China is a communist one-party
101 China Hikes 2011 Solar Power Target, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (July 3, 2009), http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90857/90860/6692473.html.
102 Existing Capacity by Energy Source, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
(Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat1p2.html.
103 News Release, First Solar Corp., First Solar and Ordos Take Key Step Forward in
2GW China Project (Nov. 17, 2009), http://investor.firstsolar.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=201491
&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1356152&highlight.
104 Id.; John Duce & Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, First Solar to Build World’s Largest Solar
Power Plant in China, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg
.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHkwySMQijs0.
105 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 13.
106 Wong & Light, supra note 57.
107 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 14.
108 Wong & Light, supra note 57.
109 See REL 2006, supra note 27.
110 China’s State Organizational Structure, CONG.-EXEC. COMM ON CHINA, http://www.cecc
.gov/pages/virtualAcad/gov/statestruct.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
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state with a “top-down” structure featuring more centralized power in the
national government than in the United States or Europe.111 The national
government carries out centralized economic planning and formulation
of regulations that guide implementation of programs and initiatives in
individual provinces.112
The National People’s Congress (“NPC”) is responsible for passing
national laws.113 One should not mistake the NPC for a popularly elected
democratic assembly. Both the NPC and its local counterparts (Local
People’s Congresses) have limited accountability, and the Communist
Party exercises control over the lawmaking process at every level.114 Under
the Chinese Constitution, the NPC is the “highest organ of state power,”
so laws adopted by the NPC or its Standing Committee are the highest
law after the Constitution itself.115 The NPC meets annually to review
and approve major new policy directions and laws that are presented to
it by the State Council and endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party’s
Central Committee.116
If the NPC is the rough equivalent of a national legislature, the
State Council is the “highest organ of state administration” and therefore
comparable to the executive branch of the United States federal govern-
ment.117 It executes laws, supervises the government bureaucracy, and
carries out administrative functions.118 The Chinese Constitution directs
the State Council to assure that laws enacted by the NPC are promptly and
properly executed, as one specifically enumerated power given to the State
Council in the Constitution is the responsibility “to adopt administrative
measures, enact administrative regulations and issue decisions and orders
in accordance with the Constitution and other laws.”119 The State Council
includes Ministries that serve as relevant central authorities for drafting
energy regulations. In the case of renewables, Article 5 of the Renewable
Energy Law120 gives specific responsibility to the State Council.121
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 XIANFA ch. III, art. 57 (1982) (China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/
Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372965.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
116 Id. at ch. III, art. 89; China’s State Organizational Structure, supra note 110.
117 XIANFA, ch. III, art. 85.
118 China’s State Organizational Structure, supra note 110.
119 XIANFA ch. III, art. 89 § 1.
120 REL 2006, supra note 27.
121 REL 2006, supra note 27, at art. 5 (“Energy authorities of the State Council implement
management for the development and utilization of renewable energy at the national level.”).
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Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is split
among more than a dozen government agencies. The most important of
these is the NDRC, the successor to the original State Planning Commis-
sion.122 As noted above, the NDRC has overall responsibility for national
macroeconomic policies,123 as set forth in its series of Five-Year Plans. The
“11th Five-Year Plan”124 covers the time period from 2006 to 2010 and
places importance on environmental and climate change objectives.125 The
NDRC’s 2007 Plan contains policy guidance that supplements the detailed
five-year plan.126
Within the NDRC, responsibility for energy policies belongs to sev-
eral different organizations.127 This continually presents coordination prob-
lems, not unlike those posed by fragmentation of energy jurisdiction in the
United States.128 As one observer puts it, with respect to energy policy, “the
government has neglected to align the conflicting interests of the many
parts under its control.”129 Various reorganizations over the years have not
alleviated these problems.130 A 1997 reshuffling transformed the Ministry
of Electric Power into the State Power Corporation (“SPC”), with regula-
tory and financial functions transferred to other ministries, including the
Ministry of Finance (“MoF”) and NDRC.131 The most recent reorganization
of energy authorities took place in 2008,132 in which “the NPC stopped short
122 Message from Chairman Zhang Ping, NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM., http://en.ndrc
.gov.cn/mfczp/default.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
123 Id.
124 NAT’L DEV AND REFORM COMM., THE OUTLINE OF THE 11TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR
NATIONAL ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(2006), available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529_71334.htm [hereinafter 11TH
FIVE-YEAR PLAN].
125 Chapter six of the plan, “Building a Resource-Conserving and Environment-Friendly
Society” contains a number of specific energy and environmental protection objectives.
Id. at ch. 6.
126 Nat’l Climate Change Programme, supra note 58, at 2.
127 Erica S. Downs, China’s “New” Energy Administration, CHINA BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec.
2008, at 42, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2008/11_china
_energy_downs/11_china_energy_downs.pdf.
128 Id. (“China’s fragmented energy bureaucracy has impeded energy governance because
there is no single institution, such as a ministry of energy, with the authority to coordinate
the interests of the various stakeholders.”).
129 Mark Hanson, China’s Energy Sector: Challenges to Reform 8 (SAIS China Studies,
Student Working Paper Series, Fall 2009), available at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/academics/
regional-studies/china/pdf/China_Studies_Working_Paper_2010_Hanson.pdf.
130 Downs, supra note 127, at 42 (noting that the “NEA is unlikely to be an exception” in
terms of governmental ability to manage and coordinate activities in the energy sector).
131 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 2.
132 Downs, supra note 127, at 42.
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of creating a unified organ to oversee the contentious issue of energy
policy.”133 According to one report, the government considered a proposal
to centralize energy authority in a “super-ministry,” but did not take that
route.134 Instead, it made a modest reconfiguration that led to the creation
of a “National Energy Administration” from the former “Energy Bureau”
and other energy offices from the NDRC, and a new “National Energy
Commission.”135 The new NEA was created at the vice-ministerial rank,
a step above where the Energy Bureau had been, but below the ministerial
level.136 See Figure 1 for the portfolio of the new NEA.137
Before 2008, “[t]he Energy Bureau under the NDRC was initially
crippled by competition for administrative power within the NDRC and
with other preexisting organizations.”138 The situation does not appear to
have improved much after the 2008 reorganization; as a vice-ministerial
body, the NEA “still lacks the authority to effectively coordinate the in-
terests of ministries, commissions, and state-owned energy companies.”139
In the 2008 reorganization, the NDRC retained one critical power: the
authority to set energy prices.140 This power is central to the NDRC’s mis-
sion of controlling the economy, and it was unwilling to part with it.141
133 Julian L. Wong, Bureaucratic Streamlining and Rule of Law, GREEN LEAP FORWARD
(Mar. 12, 2008), http://greenleapforward.com/2008/03/12/bureaucratic-streamlining-and
-rule-of-law/.
134 Julian Wong of the Center for American Progress, the author of the noted The Green
Leap Forward blog on energy and environmental matters in China, sorts out the extremely
confusing state of affairs after the 2008 reorganization in an article posted on his blog.
Julian L. Wong, The National Energy Commission: Myth-busting the “New Energy Super
Ministry,” GREEN LEAP FORWARD (Feb. 9, 2009), http://greenleapforward.com/2010/02/04/
the-national-energy-commission-myth-busting-the-new-energy-super-ministry/ (posing
the question of whether the new “National Energy Commission” created at the same time
as the NEA is intended to be a super-ministry, and positing that it is not).
135 Id.
136 Downs, supra note 127, at 43.
137 Id.
138 Hanson, supra note 129, at 4.
139 Id.
140 Charles McElwee, China’s NDRC Shakeup: Energy & Environment Implications, CHINA
ENVTL. L. (Aug. 2, 2008), http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2008/08/22/chinas-ndrc
-shakeup-energy-environment-implications [hereinafter McElwee, China’s NDRC Shakeup].
141 Downs, supra note 127, at 44. As one commenter on the China Environmental Law
blog site put it:
You’re right that some of the portfolio given to NEA is rather insignifi-
cant, but it may be a symbolic move to create a facade of independence
for NEA.
I’m not sure whether certain comments on the fact NDRC has “lost”
power as a result of the restructuring are accurate. It has always viewed
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Figure 1. China’s National Energy Administration (2008).
Other ministries with energy responsibilities include the MoF that
administers economic incentive programs including a Renewable Energy
Development Fund,142 the Ministry of Agriculture (“MoA”) that is jointly
responsible with the NDRC for rural biomass development,143 and the
Ministry of Construction that has programs aimed at building efficiency
and conservation.144
its monopoly over pricing as its primary power in a system that has yet
to fully rationalize energy prices. Cuts in personnel may have an impact
on the range of portfolio NDRC can handle, but it seems to be largely
in line with the State Council’s intention to streamline some of these
bloated bureaucracies.
In short, in an economy that still puts a premium on planning and FYPs,
a central planning commission will have wide latitude.
Damien, Comment to McElwee, China’s NDRC Shakeup, supra note 140.
142 RELAW ASSIST, RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW IN CHINA-ISSUES PAPER 36 ( 2007). See infra
notes 198–99 and accompanying text (describing the establishment of the Fund after the
adoption of the REL 2006 and the regulations governing it).
143 RELAW ASSIST, supra note 142, at 12. Under the Rural Energy Development Plan regu-
lation, the Ministry of Agriculture was assigned to draft a rural energy plan, covering
renewable and conventional energy use and energy efficiency measures in rural areas.
Id. at 13.
144 See, e.g., Geoffrey Lewis, Ministry of Construction Green Building Evaluation
Standard—The “Three Star System,” CHINA GREEN BUILDINGS BLOG (Feb. 24, 2009),
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The state-owned energy companies in China also wield considerable
power in energy decision-making.145 Until recently, China’s electric utility
sector consisted of a single, state-owned monopoly, the SPC.146 In 2002,
the State Council Electricity Reform Plan (comparable to “restructuring”
in the United States) “unbundled the SPC into five generating companies
and two grid companies.”147 The five generating companies remain con-
trolled by the state.148 The State Grid Corporation is state owned, and the
Southern Power Grid Company is privately owned.149 The head of the State
Grid Corporation holds ministerial rank, which poses a problem for the
NEA.150 As one observer puts it, “energy companies often undercut Energy
Bureau authority by holding face-to-face discussions with senior PRC
leadership.”151 A new and supposedly independent government agency,
the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (“SERC”), was established
in 2003 to regulate the electricity grid.152 However, because the NDRC has
macroeconomic planning and pricing responsibilities, the SERC “lacks
both the mandate and the resources to be a strong, effective regulator . . .
[and] still plays a secondary regulatory role to the NDRC.”153
At the local level, the Chinese Constitution provides for Local
People’s Congresses charged with legislating on specific matters relating
to localities and drafting local regulations to implement certain NPC
laws.154 The principle of “democratic centralism,”155 or concentrating
decision-making power in the national government, means that “lower
levels are always vulnerable to changes in direction and decisions origi-
nated at the central level of government . . . [and] are essentially exten-
sions of central government authorities and thus are responsible to the
http://chinagreenbuildings.blogspot.com/2009/02/ministry-of-construction-green-building
.html (discussing a new Ministry of Construction rating system for green buildings).
145 Downs, supra note 127, at 45 (“China’s state-owned energy companies will likely remain
the dominant drivers of projects and policies.”).
146 State Grid Corporations of China (SG), CHINA CRS MAP, http://www.chinacsrmap.org/
E_OrgShow.asp?CCMOrg_ID=971 (last visited Oct. 19,, 2010).
147 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 2; CHUN CHUN NI, INST. OF ENERGY ECON.,
CHINA’S ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY AND ITS TRENDS 19 (2006), available at http://eneken
.ieej.or.jp/en/data/pdf/326.pdf.
148 NI, supra note 147, at 3.
149 Id. (depicting ownership in a flow chart).
150 Downs, supra note 127, at 43.
151 Id.
152 STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMM’N OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://
www.serc.gov.cn/english/index.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
153 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 9.
154 XIANFA ch. III, art. 95, 99, 100.
155 Id. at ch. I, art.3.
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‘unified leadership’ of the central organs.”156 Still, the provinces have an
important role to play in promoting renewables, and some provincial gov-
ernments have created specific policies under the central government’s
legal framework.157 These contain “detailed provisions . . . for particular
renewable energy technologies, financial support for pilot projects and
preferential treatment in other areas such as land access.”158 Perhaps not
surprisingly, individual provinces vary widely in their commitment to re-
newables, depending on such matters as whether they are rich in renew-
able resources.159
IV. OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S LEGAL MECHANISMS TO ENCOURAGE
RENEWABLES PRIOR TO 2006
Before the adoption of the Renewable Energy Law in 2006, there
were scattered efforts underway to promote renewable energy in China.
There was no unified legal framework, and a variety of government agen-
cies undertook individual initiatives.160 The mid-1980s Integrated Rural
Energy Programme aimed to bring electric service to the country’s rural
areas and included some promotion of small hydropower projects.161 In
1987, the State Council’s Energy Conservation Office established a low-
interest loan fund that issued loans of about 120–130 million RMB (approx-
imately $15 million) annually by 1996 and had funded up to eighty percent
of seventy-four MW worth of wind power installations by that time.162
The first national document on renewable energy development was
the State Council’s 1994 “White Paper on Population, Environment, and
Development in the 21st Century,” which identified a “medium- to long-
term guide for the economic and social development of renewable energy.”163
One year later, the SPC (now NDRC), State Economic and Trade Commis-
sion, and State Science and Technology Commission (now the Ministry of
156 China’s State Organizational Structure, supra note 110.
157 RELAW ASSIST, supra note 142, at 12, 14–15 (listing regulations of individual provinces).
158 Id. at 12.
159 Id.
160 See RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 19 (noting that laws in this period
provided “little guidance” on renewables). For a general discussion of national efforts in
this time period, see Renewables in China Today, CCRE.COM.CN (June, 1, 2003), http://web
.archive.org/web/20070819131611/http://www.ccre.com.cn/English/BG.htm (accessed by
searching for Renewables in China Today in the Internet Archive index) (describing
national efforts in this time period).
161 Renewables in China Today, supra note 160.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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Science and Technology) issued a “Program of New and Renewable Energy
Development—1996–2010.”164 This first attempt to consider renewables in
the economic planning process set goals for individual renewables technol-
ogies to be achieved by 2020,165 which were echoed in the Ninth Five-Year
Plan.166 However, no specific national policy was formulated, and develop-
ment of renewables was left to the initiatives in individual ministries.167
The year 1995 also saw an “Electric Power Law” and a “New Plant,
New Price Policy” as part of continuing restructuring—like reform of the
electric utility sector.168 New investors in power generation (including
owners of renewable energy facilities) could sell electricity to the power
grid at prices set at levels sufficient to ensure repayment of their debts.169
This led to prices for wind power greater than established levels.170 With-
out a mandate for provincial grids to purchase the power, the program was
only a minor success.171 Between 1996 and 1999, the SPC conducted a
“Brightness Program” that aimed to bring electricity to 23 million people
in remote areas, deploying small-scale wind and PV technologies with an
average capacity of 100 watts (“W”) per capita and a total program planned
capacity of 2.3 GW.172 This program led to installation of about 5500
wind/PV hybrid home systems in Inner Mongolia by 2003, and 10,000 solar
home systems, three PV mini-grid village systems, and six PV village
systems of about six kilowatts (“kW”) each in size by the end of 2001.173
In the early 2000s, more programs were established to promote
renewables. NDRC’s “Ride the Wind Program” of 2001 to 2005 sought to
develop a domestic wind turbine industry that could compete with foreign
manufacturers and aimed to reduce production costs and increase the per-
centage of domestically produced wind turbines at domestic installations
from forty percent to seventy percent by the end of the Tenth Five-Year
Plan period in 2005.174 The NDRC also established the China Township
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Renewables in China Today, supra note 160.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. (noting that “[a]s a consequence of these high prices, provincial utilities have been
reluctant to purchase more than a limited amount of electricity under these terms”).
172 MA SHENGHONG, RENEWABLE ENERGY DEV. CTR., INT’L CONFERENCE FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGIES, BONN: THE BRIGHTNESS AND TOWNSHIP ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAM IN CHINA
8 (2004) (copy on file with author); Davidson, supra note 98, at 6.
173 SHENGHONG, supra note 172, at 9–10; Davidson, supra note 98, at 7.
174 NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NREL/FS-710-35787,
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Electrification Program to move toward deployment of large-scale renew-
able energy facilities in rural areas.175 This program aimed to supply power
to 1065 townships in twelve provinces with small hydropower, PV, and PV/
wind hybrid systems.176 Over 4.5 billion RMB (about $700 million) of tech-
nology found its way into village-level systems through this program.177
Some observers have noted benefits from this program, such as a boost to
domestic manufacturing capacity of PV panels and other technology.178
On the other hand, operation and maintenance issues hindered more wide-
spread program success. Remote areas have seen battery failures and
other problems, especially when the utility companies have not operated
the energy facilities.179
In general, the pre-2006 era presented a mixed picture for the
country’s efforts to deploy renewables. Relatively small but promising new
programs promoted renewable energy deployment.180 As in the United
States, however, electricity grid “reform” led to setbacks for these programs
and prompted the government to examine whether it should implement
different mechanisms for promoting renewables.181 Several barriers re-
mained to more widespread commercialization of renewables.182 Among
these was the lack of a binding requirement comparable to “renewable
portfolio standards” (“RPS”) then being developed in the United States,
which require utilities to purchase power generated from renewables.183
Studies of RPS in the pre-2006 era by Chinese researchers concluded it was
RENEWABLE ENERGY IN CHINA (2004), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy04osti/
35787.pdf. See infra notes 371–82 and accompanying text (discussing this requirement
in the context of the effects of protectionism in the domestic wind turbine industry).
175 W.L. Wallace et al., Experience for Sustainable Development of Rural Energy in China,
NDRC/UNDP/GEF PROJECT MGMT. OFFICE 1 (2006), available at www.martinot.info/
Wallace_et_al_rural_GWREF2006.pdf; SHENGHONG, supra note 172, at 12–14; Davidson,
supra note 98, at 7.
176 SHENGHONG, supra note 172, at 12; Wallace, supra note 175, at 1.
177 Wallace, supra note 175, at 1.
178 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 11.
179 Davidson, supra note 98, at 8; Wallace, supra note 175, at 7 (noting that to address the
problems “the NDRC is considering several actions including: . . . transferring ownership
of the systems to the provincial utility companies as the best option to insure a future com-
mitment to professional management and servicing of the systems”).
180 See RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 6; SHENGHONG, supra note 172, at 6.
181 See Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 4, 5, 9.
182 See Jie Fan et al., Renewables Portfolio Standard and Regional Energy Structure
Optimisation in China, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 279, 280 (2005), available at http://www.science
direct.com (enter “Jie Fan” in the author search field; then select the article by its title).
183 See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 875–905 (discussing the growth of RPSs in
the United States, and issues associated with their implementation).
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both viable and necessary for China to establish a RPS-like mandate for
purchases of electricity generated from renewables.184 As one report noted,
“it is clear that unless new instruments are developed to support the estab-
lishment of renewables in the national energy portfolio (such as an obliga-
tory Renewables Portfolio Standard), renewables will face severe difficulties
in the competitive environment of a post reform energy market.”185
V. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW AND OTHER LEGAL MECHANISMS TO
ENCOURAGE RENEWABLES IN CHINA (2006–PRESENT)
The Renewable Energy Law of 2006 (“REL 2006”)186 ushered in a
new era for the promotion of renewable energy in China, with a major over-
haul and rewrite of existing legal authorities. As there were programs in
place before its adoption, this was not the start of China’s modern renew-
able energy era. However, the new law made several bold strides forward.
First, it set out to create a national system for the development of renew-
able energy, targets for renewables in the electricity market, and a pricing
mechanism.187 Just as importantly, it officially encouraged the construc-
tion of renewable energy power facilities, making it a national priority
to do so.188
A. Renewable Energy Law of 2006
The REL 2006 is a relatively brief framework that provides the
national mandate to develop renewable energy, with specifics to follow
from plans and regulations developed by agencies.189 Article 2190 defines
eligible renewable energy sources as hydropower, wind power, solar energy,
geothermal energy, and marine energy, but not nuclear power (which has
been promoted and developed through separate laws and incentives).191
Article 4 lists renewable energy as a priority area for development,192 and
184 See, e.g., Fan, supra note 182, at 279–87 (noting that “[t]he successful implementation
of the RPS policy will achieve the goal of sharing the benefits and responsibilities of energy
production between the different regions of China”).
185 Renewables in China Today, supra note 160.
186 REL 2006, supra note 27.
187 Id.
188 Id. at arts. 13–16.
189 Id. at arts. 7–8.
190 Id. at art. 2.
191 For a summary of China’s domestic civilian nuclear efforts, see Philip Andrews-Speed,
China’s Nuclear Power Sector on the Fast Track, UNIV. OF DENDEE CEPMLP GATEWAY
(Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=30794.
192 REL 2006, supra note 27, at art. 4 (“The Government lists the development of utilization
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Article 8 calls for the NDRC to implement a national renewable energy
plan, including specific renewable energy targets,193 which leaves it up
to provincial planning agencies to develop more specific implementation
plans.194 Under Article 14, China’s electricity grid corporations are obli-
gated to interconnect with and purchase all the electricity generated by
approved renewable energy facilities located in their service areas.195 The
NDRC was tasked to set purchase prices for renewables and adjust them
from time to time as necessary.196 Importantly, Article 19, which discusses
pricing, did not establish specific criteria for setting grid purchase prices,
which would be determined later.197 The REL 2006 also creates a national
fund to foster renewable energy development,198 and lending and tax in-
centives for renewable energy projects.199
of renewable energy as the preferential area for energy development and promotes the
construction and development of the renewable energy market by establishing total volume
for the development of renewable energy and taking corresponding measures.”).
193 Id. at art. 8 (“Energy authorities of the State Council shall, on the basis of the middle
and long-term total volume target of renewable energy throughout the country, prepare
national renewable energy development and utilization plan, which is to be implemented
after being approved by the State Council.”).
194 Id.
195 Id. at art. 14:
Grid enterprises shall enter into grid connection agreement with
renewable power generation enterprises that have legally obtained ad-
ministrative license or for which filing has been made, and buy the grid-
connected power produced with renewable energy within the coverage
of their power grid, and provide grid-connection service for the generation
of power with renewable energy.
196 Id. at art. 19:
Grid power price of renewable energy power generation projects shall
be determined by the price authorities of the State Council in the prin-
ciple of being beneficial to the development and utilization of renewable
energy and being economic and reasonable, where timely adjustment
shall be made on the basis of the development of technology for the
development and utilization of renewable energy.
197 Id.
198 REL 2006, supra note 27, at art. 24; RELAW ASSIST, supra note 142, at 13. The MoF’s
Provisional Administrative Measures on the Renewable Energy Development Fund (2006)
sets out the criteria for the use of the Fund, identifies “priority areas,” and provides appli-
cation and approval procedures. Id. at 12–13. The final regulation is the MoF’s Regulation
Governing the Use of the Renewable Energy Development Fund to Promote Renewable
Energy Integration in Buildings (2006). Id. at 13. Specifics on what this fund is used for
have often been hard to come by. RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 27 (“China’s
Renewable Energy Fund has been in place for approximately four years. However, it is
unclear how much of this funding is distributed annually, what types of technology are
eligible to apply for the funding, and what precisely the application procedure entails.”).
199 REL 2006, supra note 27, at arts. 25–26.
2010] CHINA’S RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW 27
B. Implementing Plans, Regulations, and Programs
Shortly after adoption of the REL 2006, the central government
began to create laws and programs to implement it. In its 2007 Plan, the
NDRC set a goal of meeting ten percent of China’s primary energy con-
sumption with renewable energy by 2010, and fifteen percent by 2020.200 As
noted above, the 2007 Plan set targets for installed capacity of individual
renewable energy technologies such as wind and solar PV.201 Figure 2
details these targets, compared to actual power production in 2005:202
Figure 2. Renewable Energy Targets in China Under the 2007 Plan
Energy
Source
2005 2010 2020
Hydro 115 GW 190 GW 300 GW
Wind 1.30 GW 5 GW 30 GW
Solar PV 0.07 GW 0.30 GW 1.80 GW
Solar hot water 80 million m2 150 million m2 300 million m2
Biomass power
(from agricul-
tural & forestry
waste)
2 GW 5.5 GW 30 GW
Ethanol 0.80 million
tons
2 million tons 10 million tons
Biodiesel 0.05 million
tons
0.20 million
tons
2 million tons
The initial wind target was quickly exceeded,203 and in late 2009,
there was talk of a new goal for 2020 that could be as much as 100 GW of
installed capacity of wind power.204 The solar target for 2020 was also in
line to be increased to a significantly larger capacity of at least ten GW.205
200 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan, supra note 61, at 5.
201 Id. at 7–10.
202 Charles McElwee, China’s Renewable Energy Law, CHINA ENVTL. L. (Mar. 27,
2008), http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2008/03/27 [hereinafter McElwee, China’s
Renewable Energy Law].
203 See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text; Zhenhua, supra note 84 (“By the end
of 2008, 12.15 gigawatts worth had been constructed across 24 provinces—143% above
target and two years ahead of schedule.”).
204 Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82.
205 Wong & Light, supra note 57; Queenie K.Y. Cheng & Kevin H.Y. Tsen, China’s
Burgeoning Solar Power Sector, MAYER BROWN (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.mayerbrown
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Assuming that formal plans are revised upward to these announced num-
bers, renewable power generators would account for a significant percent-
age of total electricity generation. However, seasoned China observers
express caution about figures like these that are bruited about in the
press,206 noting that ambitious targets overestimate the actual amount
of renewable power on the grid.207 The government assigned each of the
ten largest power companies—State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”)208 that
generate sixty percent of China’s electricity—a goal of generating three
percent of their electricity from renewable sources by 2010.209 By the end
of 2008, only one company was poised to attain this goal.210
As noted above, Article 14 of the REL 2006 included requirements
for mandatory interconnection for renewable energy facilities to China’s
electricity grid and for grid companies to purchase power within their
coverage areas.211 Two different national regulations implemented this
Article by mandating interconnection and requiring grid companies to
purchase the full amount of electricity generated by renewable power
.com/publications/article.asp?id=7965&nid=6 (“NDRC’s Energy Research Institute reported
that the new goal for 2020 may be revised so that the installed capacity for solar power may
amount to 10 GW or more.”).
206 See, e.g., Charles McElwee, A Mighty Wind, CHINA ENVTL. L. (May 6, 2009), http://
www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2009/05/06/a-mighty-wind/#more-1697 (“I’m not believing
it until I see a formally amended copy of China’s Medium & Long-Term Renewable Energy
Development Plan.”); Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82 (“The plan has, however,
not yet been published and its details remain opaque.”).
207 See Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 1, 6; see also Kexin Liu, Wising Up: Smart
Grid as New Opening for U.S. China Energy Cooperation (Aug. 2009) (copy on file with
author); Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82.
208 See Lim, supra note 92.
209 This “mandated market share” provision is featured in Medium and Long-Term
Development Plan, supra note 61, at 11:
In areas covered by large scale power grids, non-hydro renewable power
generation’s share of total power generation will reach 1 percent by 2010
and over 3 percent by 2020. Power generators with self-owned installed
capacity of over 5 GW will be required to have a non-hydro renewable
energy installed power capacity self-owned that accounts for 3 percent
of their total capacity by 2010 and for over 8 percent of their total self-
owned capacity by 2020.
See Polluting Power: China’s Top Power Companies Ranked, GREENPEACE CHINA (July 28,
2009), http://www.greenpeace.org/china/en/news/china-power-ranked; Christina Larson,
A Climate Dilemma for China, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www
.publicintegrity.org/investigations/global_climate_change_lobby/articles/entry/1801; Yu
Tianyu, A ‘No Coal’ Campaign in China, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 10,2009), http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-08/10/content_8548125.htm.
210 Polluting Power, supra note 209; Larson, supra note 209; Tianyu, supra note 209.
211 REL 2006, supra note 27, at art. 14; see supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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producers in their grid areas: the NDRC’s “Regulation on the Adminis-
tration of Power Generation from Renewable Energy” and the SERC’s
“Measures on Supervision and Administration of Grid Enterprises in the
Purchase of Renewable Energy Power.”212 The NDRC’s regulation set
general rules for grid connection, including utility company and generator
responsibilities.213 The regulation mandated that all energy generated
from renewable sources must be purchased and that utilities “must provide
grid-connection services and related technical support.”214
The REL 2006 also marked the inception of innovative power pric-
ing arrangements based on Article 19, including fixed government pricing
comparable to European-style feed-in tariffs (“FITs”),215 and competitive
tendering systems.216 Fixed government pricing “offers renewable energy
generators a guaranteed power price.”217 When coupled with the obligation
to purchase power, a FIT is intended to stimulate the development of the
renewable energy market by providing a stable long-term incentive for
power production.218 In other nations, the FIT has proven to be successful
in stimulating industry development.219 In a competitive tendering system,
the government administers a bidding process for a contract for a pre-
determined amount of electricity generated from renewables.220 The con-
tractor with the lowest price bid wins the contract and supplies the power,
assuming it meets other requirements.221 The two systems of pricing have
both been used in China, as discussed more fully below.
212 Regulation on the Administration of Power Generation from Renewable Energy
(promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n of the People’s Republic of China,
2006) (non-authorized version), http://www.martinot.info/China_RE_Law_Guidelines
_2_NonAuth.pdf; Measures on Supervision and Administration of Grid Enterprises in the
Purchase of Renewable Energy Power (promulgated by the State Electric Regulatory
Comm’n of the People’s Republic of China, 2007) (Chinese language), available at http://
www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/01/content_702636.htm; see also National Policy, CHINA
WIND POWER CTR., http://www.cwpc.cn/cwpc/en/node/6548#2r (listing and describing these
regulations); Cheng & Tsen, supra note 205 (listing and describing these regulations).
213 Cheng & Tsen, supra note 205.
214 Id.
215 For a discussion of FITs and the European and American experience with them, see
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 905–12.
216 RELAW ASSIST, supra note 142, at 26.
217 Id.
218 Id.; KRAVETZ, supra note 3.
219 See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 906–07, 919 (citing positive results in European
nations, including Germany and Denmark).
220 RELAW ASSIST, supra note 142, at 26.
221 Id.
30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:1
Beyond seeking to integrate renewable energy production more
fully with the electricity grid, the REL 2006 and subsequent regulations
contain a number of financial incentives for power producers. Articles 20
through 23 establish cost-sharing arrangements to divide the costs of
renewable energy generation and grid connection between utilities and
electricity end users.222 End users of electricity, other than Tibet residents
and those in the agriculture sector, pay a small surcharge on their electric
bills of 0.001 RMB per kWh (0.002 RMB per kWh for commercial and in-
dustrial users as of August 2008) to cover part of the difference between
the price of coal-fired power and power generated from renewables.223 Pro-
ceeds from the surcharge, which now total over $200 million annually,
have supported renewable energy projects (as one observer notes, “mostly
wind and biomass”).224 As for other financial incentives, while “China lags
behind most countries in using tax measures to create incentives for renew-
able energy deployment,”225 a VAT-based tax policy gives domestic wind
power equipment manufacturers significant benefits,226 and domestic wind
power equipment manufacturers receive subsidies from the MoF.227
China has also developed programs that subsidize installations
of new renewable energy equipment by end users.228 In March 2009, the
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development implemented a sub-
sidy for rooftop and building-integrated PV (“BIPV”) installations at 15
RMB (about $2.50) per watt for rooftop systems and 20 RMB per watt
(about $3) for BIPV,229 with an impressive 1.27 billion RMB (approxi-
mately $186 million) of subsidies distributed under this program in its
first six months.230 The “Golden Sun” program, started in 2009 by the MoF,
222 REL 2006, supra note 27 (“The excess between the expenses that power grid enterprises
purchase renewable power on the basis of the price determined in Article 19 hereof and
the expenses incurred in the purchase of average power price generated with conventional
energy shall be shared in the selling price.”).
223 Wong & Light, supra note 57.
224 Id. (citing figures from the SERC that the surcharge yielded $34.6 million in 2006, $106
million in the 1st through 3rd quarter of 2007, and $295.2 million in the 4th quarter of
2007 through the 2nd quarter of 2008).
225 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 22.
226 See, e.g., CHINA WIND POWER CTR., supra note 212.
227 Id.; RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 20, 25.
228 The Golden Sun of China, PV GROUP, http://www.pvgroup.org/events/ctr_031358 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2010).
229 Id.
230 China Urged to Introduce On-Grid Solar Power Tariff, ENERGY CHINA FORUM (Oct. 30,
2009), http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/27645.shtml. By way of comparison, in
the United States, individual states received funding under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act for renewable energy and energy efficiency technology. The state of
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Ministry of Science and Technology, and National Energy Administration,
provides subsidies for utility-scale solar installations of 300 kW and up.231
The subsidy is fifty percent of the total cost of on-grid systems and seventy
percent of the total cost of off-grid systems in rural areas.232 The program
is capped at 680 MW, or 20 MW for each of China’s thirty-four provinces
and autonomous regions.233
C. 2009 Amendments to the Renewable Energy Law
In August 2009, a package of amendments to the Renewable Energy
Law was submitted to the NPC for approval,234 and the amendments were
approved in December.235 The package contained three major changes:236
(1) A call for more oversight of renewable energy proj-
ects from the national level (although this was al-
ready required, and detailed specifics were lacking
on what this change would entail);237
(2) A requirement that the State Council and related
governmental bodies develop a regulation to deter-
mine the specific amount of electricity to be pur-
chased by grid companies;238 and
Virginia offered $2 per watt for installations up to ten kW in size, with a program maxi-
mum of $15 million. See Virginia Residential and Commercial Solar and Wind Incentive
Program, VA DEP’T OF MINES, MINERALS, AND ENERGY http://www.dmme.virginia.gov/de/
arra-public/RenewableEnergyRebateTerms.pdf (last updated Sept. 16, 2010).
231 GREEN CROSS INT’L, 2009 GLOBAL SOLAR REPORT CARDS 29 (2009), available at http://
www.globalgreen.org/docs/publication-108-1.pdf; The Golden Sun of China, supra note
228. In the program announcement, there was no clarity on whether subsidies were a one-
off or a permanent program, or whether and how subsidized projects would be connected
to the electricity grid. Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82.
232 The Golden Sun of China, supra note 228.
233 Id.
234 China Considering Renewable Energy Development Fund, CHINA VIEW (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/24/content_11937062.htm.
235 Charles McElwee, China’s Renewable Energy Law Amendments, CHINA ENVTL. L.
(Dec. 28, 2009), http://www.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/2009/12/28/chinas-renewable
-energy-law-amendments [hereinafter McElwee, China’s Renewable Energy Law Amend-
ments]; Sara Schuman, China Renews Its Commitment to Renewable Energy, NRDC
SWITCHBOARD (Feb. 1, 2010), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/bfinamore/china_renews
_its_commitment_to.html (giving an excellent analysis of the amendments).
236 McElwee, China’s Renewable Energy Law Amendments, supra note 235.
237 Id.
238 Id.
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(3) Changes to the national fund for research and
development.239
Of these, the most potentially significant is the revised purchase
obligation. Grid companies are already required under the REL 2006 and
other existing regulations to purchase power from renewable energy pro-
ducers.240 However, they have resisted this at times, and the concept of
developing a numerical purchase target is a tacit recognition that more
compulsion is needed.241 In 2008, Charles McElwee, an American environ-
mental lawyer and editor of the highly regarded China Environmental
Law blog, stated that the Renewable Energy Law was missing “(1) a spe-
cific assignment of responsibility to a political entity or the grid companies
for achieving the renewable energy goals, and (2) the establishment of tar-
get achievement as a factor upon which local political official’s job perfor-
mance will be based.”242 McElwee noted that the lack of concrete purchase
requirements tied to officials’ performance indicators had created “resis-
tance on the ground to grid access for certain renewable energy projects.”243
It remains to be seen how well the new quota-like approach will
work in practice. As of mid-2010, details of the new regulations relating to
numerical purchase targets had not been set,244 making it too soon to tell.
McElwee points to another “significant change” made by the 2009 amend-
ments to the previous law, which amended the penalty section of the REL
2006 (Articles 29 to 31).245 Renewable power producers who are kept off
the grid are now entitled to damages set at up to twice their economic
239 CHINA VIEW, supra note 234:
Under the current surcharge, income will reach 4.5 billion yuan (689
million U.S. dollars) for 2009. The fund would continue to support scien-
tific and technological research. It will also finance a pilot project for
exploiting renewable energy, construction of renewable energy projects
for domestic use in rural areas as well as independent power systems
in remote areas and islands, localized equipment production and exploit-
ing renewable energy, among other projects, says the draft amendment.
Management of the fund will be worked out by finance, energy and
pricing sectors of the State Council.
240 McElwee, China’s Renewable Energy Law Amendments, supra note 235.
241 See McElwee, China’s Renewable Energy Law, supra note 202.
242 Id.
243 Id.; see also infra notes 235–42 and accompanying text (discussing this issue).
244 Stephen Leonelli, Recent Climate Change News in the Chinese Media, GREENLAW
(May 19, 2010), http://www.greenlaw.org.cn/enblog/?p=2385 (citing comments made at
a green technology forum in May 2010 by Dr. Ren Dongming of the NDRC).
245 McElwee, China’s Renewable Energy Law Amendments, supra note 235.
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loss, double the previously available amount.246 In the long run, this may
prompt more compliance with the existing purchase obligation.
VI. CHALLENGES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY IN CHINA
As it grows and matures, the renewable energy sector in China
faces a host of challenges. Some relate to the regulatory environment in
place after the REL 2006, a law that has been criticized as “not well-
implemented.”247 In particular, China faces challenges in getting electricity
produced from renewables to its electrical grid248 and setting purchase
prices for that power at sufficient levels to encourage investment in re-
newable energy technology.249 Because subsidies provided under the
international climate change regime are vital to domestic projects,250 the
uncertainty associated with continuation of that subsidy regime clouds
the future of renewable energy deployment. Finally, preferential treatment
of domestic companies in renewable power projects has led to charges of
protectionism and suggestions that project development may be hampered
in some cases by restrictive domestic content requirements.251
A. Challenges Relating to Grid Infrastructure and Interconnection
of Small Power Producers
Wind farm and solar facilities in China are growing faster than
the supporting grid infrastructure needed to support them. As of late
2009, roughly one-third of all installed wind turbines (representing four
GW of capacity) were not yet connected to the nation’s electrical grid.252
In the Inner Mongolia region, a site of numerous wind projects, the Inner
246 Id.
247 Christina Larson, China Confronts Global Warming Dilemma, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Global-Warming/2009/1112/china
-confronts-global-warming-dilemma (citing Barbara Finamore of the Natural Resources
Defense Council, an expert on China and renewable energy).
248 See Liu, supra note 207, at 3.
249 See Larson, supra note 247.
250 See THOMAS R. HOWELL ET AL., DEWEY & LEBOEUF LLP, CHINA’S PROMOTION OF THE
RENEWABLE ELECTRIC POWER EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY (2010), available at http://www.nftc
.org/default/Press%20Release/2010/China Renewable Energy.pdf.
251 See infra Part VI.D.
252 See Jing Yang, China’s Wind Farms Come With a Catch: Coal Plants, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125409730711245037.html (quoting fig-
ures and arguing that the lack of connections will increase the need for conventionally
generated power).
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Mongolia Electric Power Industry Association (“EPIA”) reported that nearly
one-third of capacity sat idle.253 Another source notes that “[n]early 150
million kilowatt hours of generated power went unused in the Guazhou
and Yumen areas of Gansu because the grid could not absorb the power
they produced. This represented 27 percent of Guazhou’s and 33 percent
[of] Yumen’s actual wind power production.”254
There are several reasons for this idling of wind power capacity.
Technical challenges and other problems are hampering grid access for
wind power producers.255 As one observer sagely notes, “[t]here are cur-
rently structural and technical barriers which will restrain the growth of
wind in some areas of China. It is simply not a matter of build it and
they (the grid) will come.”256 A Chinese researcher notes that, “in 2008 all
major Chinese wind power developers reported cases in which they were
denied access to the grid due to various technical issues as well as lack of
experience of the State Grid Corporation of China (“SGCC”) in managing
high-voltage transmission.”257 The simple lack of basic infrastructure re-
quired to connect wind power is often a problem.258 The dearth of capacity
to handle added electricity generated from renewables is a “major con-
straint.”259 China also faces a problem of geography. As in the United
States, the best windy sites in China are often located far from dense
urban areas and the power grid,260 requiring extensive and expensive
253 Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88; Zhenhua, supra note 84 (turbines sit in
Inner Mongolia for as long as six months without being connected to the grid).
254 Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88; see also Zhenhua, supra note 84.
255 Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88; see also Zhenhua, supra note 84.
256 McElwee, A Mighty Wind, supra note 206.
257 See Liu, supra note 207, at 3.
258 Zhenhua, supra note 84. The author discusses this problem and offers several examples,
including the following:
Guazhou’s Beidaqiao wind farm has lost 17.7 million yuan (US$2.6
million) over two years of operation. ‘The main reason is that grid
capacity is inadequate and we have no choice but to limit output,’ says
manager Xu Qinghui. Only 50% to 60% of the 150 megawatts generated
can normally be delivered to the grid, and at times as little as 30%.
Id.
259 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 26. The need for improved electricity
delivery infrastructure in China is acute. As one observer notes, “[c]ompared with some
countries’ systems, which boast only 2–3% annual loss of generated power, China
averages roughly 7% loss per year . . . and U.S. losses have reached 9% . . . in recent
years.” Elizabeth Balkan, China’s Smart Grid Ambitions Could Open Door to US-China
Cooperation, SOLVE CLIMATE NEWS (June 5, 2009), http://solveclimatenews.com/news/
20090605/chinas-smart-grid-ambitions-could-open-door-us-china-cooperation.
260 This is ably illustrated graphically in Dexin, supra note 77, at 17 (“Distribution Map
of Wind Farm [sic] in China” showing current and planned wind farms and locations). See
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investments in transmission lines to bring power to the grid.261 An up-
graded grid is increasingly viewed as “indispensable” to promoting China’s
continued development of renewables.262
Simply connecting to the existing grid can be a challenge. As one
report notes, “[t]ransmission networks are not designed with large-scale
renewable energy facilities in mind, and . . . there is limited training avail-
able to grid controllers on how to manage this form of power generation on
the network.”263 The task of managing the grid is complex, and grid control
in China operates very differently from the United States.
Like many other countries with large geographical areas,
China’s electricity grid is regional rather than national, with
six primary regional synchronous grids, each composed of
provincial sub-grids . . . . [I]nter-regional and intra-regional
transmission capacity is relatively constrained. For practical
purposes, many of China’s grids operate at the level of pro-
vincial control areas. In China the word ‘utilities’, in the
sense of load serving entities (LSEs), most appropriately
describes provincial grid companies, rather than national
grid companies per se.264
The intermittency of wind power requires sophisticated dispatch
operations to balance it with plants burning fossil fuels that operate con-
tinuously.265 There are indications that Chinese grid controllers in areas
such as Inner Mongolia have found this sort of balancing to be difficult.266
This situation may change as grid companies come to grips more fully
with the technical challenges of interconnection.267 A worrisome problem
also Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82.
261 See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 40, at 39 (describing the infrastructure needed to
complete a “significant expansion” of the power transmission and distribution grid).
262 Id. at 53.
263 RELAW ASSIST, supra note 142, at 24.
264 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 9 (emphasis added).
265 Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88.
266 Id. (“[P]ower grid scheduling is difficult, since the regional grid lacks the hydropower
and natural gas power plants that help grid operators adjust power feeds when necessary
to counteract the relative instability of wind power supplies. Rather, according to a wind
power plant staffer in the region, grids can only rely on thermal power.”).
267 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 26 (“Many grid companies are begin-
ning to seek technical solutions to enable proper connectivity for large-scale wind farms
and solar PV parks”); Lim, supra note 92 (“The government is shifting its emphasis from
capacity to actual generation and connectivity to the electric grid, which should incentivize
domestic manufacturers and developers to improve quality and reliability.”).
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reported from some areas of China is competition for access to the over-
stressed grid with conventional fuel plants.268 With relatively few excep-
tions, wind power generators are located in the same parts of the country
as conventional plants.269 Grid controllers appear to be making some dis-
patch decisions that hamper the ability of wind power to reach the grid,270
and one source estimates that in 2008 these restrictions kept 370 million
kWh in wind power off the transmission grid.271 One research report sug-
gests that provincial grid controllers may even be deliberately disfavoring
sources located in other provinces.272 This proposition, if true, would be a
major barrier to the growth of renewable power in China. Another observer
cites statements from the Chinese wind power industry that generators
are required to agree to curtailment provisions (requiring connections to
be severed if necessary) in “clear violation” of the law.273
More sweeping changes may come from China’s effort to develop
a “smart grid”274 under the “Strengthened Smart Grid” plan announced
in 2009 by the State Grid Corporation.275 The nascent American smart
268 See Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 9 (“Provincial grid companies have historically
favored provincially-owned generating units in allocating operating hours.”).
273 Schuman, supra note 235.
274 A “smart grid” is “not a single entity, rather an umbrella term that covers modernization
of both the transmission and distribution grids.” Liu, supra note 207, at 3; see, e.g., U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, SMART GRID SYSTEM REPORT iii (2009), available at http://www.oe
.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/SGSRMain_090707_lowres.pdf (noting that in the U.S.,
“[t]he state of smart grid deployment covers a broad array of electric system capabilities
and services enabled through pervasive communications and information technology, with
the objective to improve reliability, operating efficiency, resiliency to threats, and our
impact to the environment”). BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 63, at 984–95 describes the
wide variety of efforts in the United States to establish technologies and best practices
for a smart grid.
275 Jerry Li, From Strong to Smart: The Chinese Smart Grid and its Relation with the
Globe, ASIA ENERGY PLATFORM (Sept. 2009), available at http://aepfm.org/ufiles/pdf/Smart
%20Grid%20-%20AEPN%20Sept.pdf, describes the three phases of the Strengthened Smart
Grid plan:
2009–2010: Planning and Testing . . . establishing developmental plan,
setting up technical & operational standards, developing technologies
& equipment, performing trial tests;
2011–2015: Construction and Development . . . [building ultra high
voltage lines], urban and rural grids construction, establishing the basic
framework for smart grid operation control and interaction, achieving
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grid plans put a heavy focus on integrating smart digital technology and
distributed generation with the transmission grid while at the same time
upgrading existing transmission infrastructure.276 China’s focus is some-
what different, as the word “strengthened” suggests. At present, “China’s
vision of the modernized grid is highly centralized in terms of generation
while the U.S. approach has a higher dependence on distributional gener-
ation[.]”277 China expects to build many new ultra-high voltage transmis-
sion (“UHV”) lines to create a grid that can reliably transmit large amounts
of electricity across the country.278 The ambitious program of development,
which Secretary Chu referred to in the Senate hearing,279 calls for $44 bil-
lion in spending on UHV power lines.280 Possible high voltage lines would
connect Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Xinjiang, and Jiangsu provinces
to consumers in eastern cities.281
The proposed scale of these expenditures is enormous. One part of
the plan calls for 120 billion RMB (about $17.5 billion) to be spent to up-
grade the grid in Gansu province for a wind farm to grow to twenty GW,
and a comparable amount in Inner Mongolia to link to wind farms there.282
A high voltage (750 kv) transmission line would span the entire nation, con-
necting Xiangyang, in China’s northwest, to the country’s eastern cities.283
Together with this construction would be a massive effort to develop stan-
dards for a smart grid and deploy technologies needed for operation and
control.284 These technologies may be developed in part through cooperation
the projected advancements in technology and equipment production,
mass deployment;
2016–2020: Upgrading.
276 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 274.
277 Liu, supra note 207, at 5.
278 Li, supra note 275, at 2–3 (describing the interest in UHV spanning over a decade in
China, and listing UHV projects underway).
279 See Chu, supra note 6.
280 Chen Aizhu, China to Spend $44 Bln by 2012 on UHV Power Lines, REUTERS, May 21,
2009, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINPEK1781620090521; see also
Wong & Light, supra note 57, at 4 (listing this as one initiative relating to China’s efforts
to address climate change).
281 China Plans to Develop National Smart Grid by 2020, CS China Energy Update (U.S.
Commercial Service, Beijing, China), Aug. 2009, at 13, http://www.export.gov/china/
exporting_to_china/August%202009%20China%20Energy%20Newsletter.pdf.
282 Fairley, supra note 4; China Has Recorded Newly Added Installed Wind Power Capacity
of 2.57 GW in the First Seven Months, CHINA WIND POWER CTR., http://www.cwpc.cn/
cwpc/en/node/5996 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
283 Fairley, supra note 4; Zhenhua, supra note 84, at 4.
284 Li, supra note 275, at 2–3.
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with the United States as it embarks on its own smart grid effort.285 For
example, there is ongoing bilateral work through the “Joint US-China
Cooperation on Clean Energy Smart Grid Cooperative.”286
These and many more efforts will be required to enable China to
grow rapidly in deploying renewable energy technology. Challenges re-
maining to be addressed include a lack of uniform technical standards and
a lack of demand data so supply and demand can be managed efficiently.287
As one report shows, the overall picture at present gives the impression
of an overemphasis on building generation capacity over ensuring proper
connectivity to the grid.288 The problems with connecting to the grid are
acute at present levels of solar and wind capacity, let alone the fantastic
levels of growth projected for the next decade. Some point to overbuilding
and a “bubble” or “glut” of wind turbines as the culprit.289 This is an
interesting issue—have China’s governmental incentives resulted in too
much investment in renewable energy facilities?290—and it may become
a much bigger issue in the future.
B. Lack of a Sophisticated and Reliable Tariff System
China’s system of pricing electricity generated from renewables
has been criticized for not providing sufficient and stable incentives for
renewable resource deployment.291 A 2006 NDRC regulation, “Provisional
285 Liu, supra note 207, at 7 (discusses “Opportunities For US-China Cooperation on Smart
Grid”); Balkan, supra note 259, also views the United States and China as potential
“[p]artners in [s]mart [g]rid [e]xploration.” A fuller description of ongoing bilateral efforts
on smart grid technologies is beyond the scope of this article. However, it should be noted
that this is one area in which the U.S.-China relationship in energy technology need not
be a zero-sum game. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text (discussing how U.S.
and China efforts in promoting greentech can be cooperative, not adversarial).
286 The purpose of this effort is “to bring together Smart Grid experts across the world to
work closely with China’s two utilities and key influencers to jointly define Smart Grid
in a way that makes sense in China.” Press release, Joint U.S.-China Comm. on Clean
Energy, Launch of Smart Grid Initiative to Meet China’s Energy Challenge, (Nov. 10,
2008), available at http://www.juccce.com/documents/JUCCCE_Smart_Grid_press_release
_081110.doc.
287 Liu, supra note 207, at 6–7.
288 Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88. See generally Zhenhua, supra note 84.
289 Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88. See generally Zhenhua, supra note 84.
290 See generally Zhenhua, supra note 84.
291 See NRDC ECON. RES. INST., A STUDY OF ELECTRICITY TARIFF POLICY FOR PROMOTING
ENERGY CONSERVATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 5–6 (2005), available at 
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Administrative Measures on Pricing and Cost Sharing for Renewable
Energy Power Generation (NDRC Price [2006] No. 7), established a method
of fixed pricing.”292 This system was different from a European FIT, be-
cause the price paid to generators was not designed to yield a reasonable
rate of return.293 Instead, it was fixed at a level above the on-grid price of
electricity generated from desulfurized coal.294 At first, it applied only to
biomass.295 The biomass price was set at the provincial or local on-grid
price of desulfurized coal, plus a government subsidy of 0.25 RMB ($0.03)
per kWh, with the subsidy decreasing at an annual rate of two percent
for projects approved after 2010.296
Solar project pricing has been “determined in the principle of
reasonable costs plus reasonable profits by the price authorities of the
State Council.”297 Solar industry companies and outside observers criti-
cize this project-specific methodology. Prices set after project approval are
not consistent signals to would-be investors in renewable energy projects
because they are not determined in advance as are European-style FITs.298
An industry organization calling for a tariff system concluded that “[w]ith
today’s [solar] system cost, national subsidy . . . is not enough to ensure
a reasonable return on investment.”299 A 2007 study recommended working
toward the setting of a national European-style FIT for each technology
based on its specific characteristics, including generation potential, tech-
nology maturity, and geographic distribution.300 In 2005, researchers at
the NDRC recommended a standard tariff with these distinctions and
http://www.efchina.org/csepupfiles/report/2006102695218562.184880057102.pdf/Pricing
_IER_EN_final.pdf.
292 Provisional Administrative Measures on Pricing and Cost Sharing for Renewable
Energy Power Generation (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev’t and Reform Comm. of the
People’s Republic of China, Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.cresp.org.cn/upload
files/2/969/ndrc%20price%202006%20document%20no.7.pdf [hereinafter Provisional
Administrative Measures].
293 This aspect of the design of European FITs is discussed in BOSSELMAN, ET AL., supra
note 63, at 906–07.
294 Provisional Administrative Measures, supra note 292, at art. 5.
295 Id. at art. 7.
296 Id.
297 Id. at art. 9; see also Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82, for a discussion of how
this approach worked in practice.
298 Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82, at 2 (“Obviously, this approach does not
provide a high level of certainty to investors as to whether a project will be approved; nor,
once a project has been approved, as to whether it will receive a feed-in price allowing it
to become profitable.”).
299 The Golden Sun of China, supra note 228, at 1.
300 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 27.
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a price set at levels above the provincial on-grid prices for electricity to
account for different costs in different provinces.301
In 2009, the NDRC priced the Dunhuang ten MW solar project at
1.09 RMB ($0.15) per kWh.302 Later that year, the NDRC was expected to
fix a benchmark on-grid price for solar power generation.303 One source put
the expected level at that of the Dunhuang project, calling it a “lowball”
level.304 Another expected a tariff of approximately 1.1–1.2 RMB ($0.17)
per kWh, a level still not thought by the industry to be sufficiently high
to attract new investment.305 In April 2010, the NDRC set the price for
four projects in northwestern Ningxia province at 1.15 RMB ($0.169) per
kWh.306 This action indicated that the NDRC would be using an open
tender system to price individual projects, as the announced tariff had
not yet been issued.307 Pricing of solar projects thus retained its ad hoc
character. In May 2010, Bruce Sohn, the President of First Solar, deemed
approval of some form of subsidy rates to be critical to the future of the
mammoth Ordos project, stating that “[w]e’re missing a key area: clarity
about what the price per kilowatt hour will be.”308
Initially, China also rejected adopting a FIT for wind power, despite
expectations in the wind power industry that the REL 2006 would lead to
a tariff system.309 The government handled pricing for wind power with
301 See NRDC ECON. RES. INST., supra note 291, at 7–9, 59–61.
302 Li Qiyan, Slow Sunrise for China’s Solar Power Pricing, CAIJING.COM.CN (Oct. 29,
2010), http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-10-29/110297591.html [hereinafter Qiyan, Slow
Sunrise]; Chris Brown, China Sets On-Grid Tariff for Utility Solar Plants as Chinese
Solar Stock Prices Jump, CHINA SOLAR ENERGY (Apr. 14, 2010), http://chinasolarenergy
.blogspot.com/2010/04/china-sets-on-grid-tariff-for-utility.html.
303 See Brown, supra note 302.
304 See Qiyan, Slow Sunrise, supra note 302 (quoting a “source at a Dunhuang power
company” who states that, “[p]olicy for on-grid electricity decides the fate of power gener-
ation companies [and] [i]f 1.09 yuan per kilowatt hour is set as the benchmark price, the
majority of photovoltaic enterprises will be unable to achieve profitability”).
305 Solar Power On-Grid Price Likely to Come Out Before Year End at 1.1–1.2 Yuan/kWh,
ENERGY CHINA FORUM (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.energychinaforum.com/news/27649
.shtml (noting that “a number of companies still regard a price set at 1.1 to 1.2 yuan/kWh
too low to accept, and when talking to the NDRC they argued that an on-grid solar power
price 1.5 yuan/kWh would be reasonable”).
306 Brown, supra note 302.
307 Id.
308 First Solar Faces Delay on China Plans Over Prices, Sohn Says, BLOOMBERG BUS.
WEEK (May 19, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-19/first-solar-faces
-delay-on-china-plans-over-prices-sohn-says.html.
309 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 6. (stating bluntly that “[w]ith the passage of the
Renewable Energy Law, the wind industry had hoped to receive a fixed feed-in tariff to
support a more stable growth environment. Those hopes did not materialize”).
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a competitive tender system for projects of fifty MW and larger.310 The
competitive bidding process took both considerations of power price and
projects’ domestic content into account as key criteria.311 Under this
system, pricing was determined for two different periods during the life-
time of a wind power project: one price for up to 30,000 full load hours of
generation, and another after that “set as the average electricity price of
the local grid at that time.”312 For smaller projects, provincial government
agencies had the authority to approve and price them, and terms and
conditions “are often negotiated on an individual basis.”313
There were many problems with a competitive tendering approach.
In several rounds of bidding between 2003 and 2009, winning bids were
below the cost of generating electricity and resulted in under-pricing of
power generated by renewables.314 A SERC research report on wind power
development in seven provinces found that the low prices were hampering
wind power development.315 Bidding rules were modified for the fifth round
to discourage below-cost bids, which “improved the situation somewhat
but did not fundamentally change it.”316 By contrast, prices in projects
approved by local governments were occasionally much higher, in some
cases as much as twice the price paid in the national bidding system, lead-
ing one study to conclude that the competitive tender system yielded both
“disappointing performance in projects that have been underpriced and
a high cost to society in projects that have been overpriced.”317
The competitive bidding process was not linked to a resource plan-
ning and portfolio management process.318 Multinational companies also
criticized it for a lack of transparency and favoritism of SOEs.319 SOEs are
not required to make profits and can therefore underestimate their costs
310 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 10.
311 Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82.
312 Id.
313 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 6.
314 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 10 (“[T]ariffs offered by winning con-
cessions were too low to be viable.”).
315 Infrastructure Woes Hamper China Wind Farms’ Push for Profitability, GUARDIAN.CO.UK.
(July 27, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/27/network-windpower
(citing the report).
316 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY, supra note 65, at 10.
317 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 6. Tariffs for projects competitively bid were as
low as 0.41 yuan/kWh, and for projects authorized by provincial governments, tariffs were
as high as 0.80 yuan/kWh. Id.
318 RELAW ASSIST, supra note 142, at 31.
319 Lim, supra note 92.
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without fear of the consequences.320 Pointing to results in which SOEs
underbid other firms in wind power tender rounds, other companies decried
a process that “do[es] little to stimulate development of a diverse market
with multiple independent power producers”321 because the “implicit default
protection from the Chinese government” allowed SOEs “to sacrifice profit-
ability on wind projects in favor of ensuring they can meet the government’s
looming capacity targets.”322 The close relationships between executives of
the SOEs and the central government lead to accusations of collusive be-
havior.323 A perhaps predictable result of these inefficiencies is that SOEs
have done a poor job of evaluating wind resources and project costs.324
In 2009, the NDRC replaced the competitive tender system with a
new feed-in tariff for wind that featured a zonal approach.325 The “Circular
on Refining the Policy for On-Grid Pricing of Wind Power (NDRC Price
[2009] No. 1906)” established fixed prices that apply to onshore wind power
projects approved after August 1, 2009.326 The zonal approach creates four
different regions in China, with different prices set for each area.327 The
prices are lower (0.51 RMB/kWh, or roughly $0.06/kWh) in regions such
as Inner Mongolia, which have the most wind power capacity already on
line and were thought to need smaller subsidies, than in regions with
fewer wind resources (with prices $0.079–0.089/kWh).328
Even before any projects had been started under the new wind
tariff system, it was praised as setting a more favorable and stable invest-
ment climate for wind power.329 Still, China’s solar and wind tariffs were
only recently announced, and there are significant differences between
320 See RELAW ASSIST, supra note 142, at 35 (identifying the “competitive advantage of
state-owned corporations which are supported by government subsidies, allowing them
to put in lower bids for tendered projects than would be feasible for foreign, profit-oriented
companies”).
321 Id. at 29.
322 Lim, supra note 92.
323 Id. (noting that “the government likely exerts more covert influence on sourcing deci-
sions through SOE developers; many executives within these firms are former energy
ministry officials, providing the government with informal influence channels”).
324 Williams & Kahrl, supra note 90, at 6.
325 Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82, at 2; Zhenhua, supra note 84.
326 Chen & Tsen, supra note 205, at 2; see also Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82,
at 2.
327 Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82, at 2.
328 Zhenhua, supra note 84.
329 See CHINA WIND POWER CTR., supra note 212 (“[T]he benchmark electricity price method
is conductive to regulate the mechanisms of market and price. With no vicious competition
of low electricity prices, it is beneficial for the investors.”).
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their pricing signals. There is a need for further policy development in this
area, and as one article notes, “China faces many challenges and lacks a
solid foundation to establish an effective national FIT system.”330
C. Clean Development Mechanism Concerns
The Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), established under
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol,331 is one of the “flexible mechanisms” avail-
able to nations obligated to reduce emissions under this international
climate change agreement.332 Under the CDM (Kyoto Annex B) nations
with specific reduction targets333 undertake projects in nations not obli-
gated to reduce emissions and gain credits known as “Certified Emissions
Reductions” (“CERs”) for those projects toward their own reduction tar-
gets.334 China is by far the biggest location of CDM projects in the world
and has therefore been the primary beneficiary of CDM subsidies.335 The
number of CDM projects in China has increased dramatically, from 138
in 2006 to 1608 by the end of 2008.336
The added financial incentives from the CDM program can make
a significant difference in assessing the viability of proposed projects. A
European study of China and the CDM notes that “[s]upport provided by
government policy [in China] is not sufficient to overcome the higher de-
velopment cost of renewable energy,”337 and concludes that “CER revenue
can improve the profitability of the investment, making unprofitable proj-
ects profitable on the margin, and (in the longer term) support the scaling
up of renewable energies.”338
330 The Golden Sun of China, supra note 228.
331 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 12,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
332 See Clean Development Mechanism, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718
.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 EU-CHINA CDM FACILITATION PROJECT, THE PRE-2012 CDM MARKET IN CHINA: POLICY
CONTEXT AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 29 (2009), available at http://www.euchina-cdm
.org (follow “Pre-2012 CDM Market in China” hyperlink).
336 Id. at 29, 31–32. The UNFCCC governing body keeps detailed statistics on CDM projects
in a “CDM Registry.” CDM Registry, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Registry/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
337 EU-CHINA CDM FACILITATION PROJECT, supra note 335, at 27.
338 Id. at 27–28.
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CDM subsidies are particularly important to China’s wind power
industry.339 One industry analyst claims most wind projects in China will
not be financially viable without them.340 Another researcher is less con-
vinced, stating that developers need to start projects and expend large
sums up front before they have certainty about the availability of CDM
subsidies.341 However, even that report notes that CDM subsidies may
make up as much as ten percent of project costs, and at the margin, the
availability of subsidies may be essential for some wind power projects
in China.342
The relationship between China’s wind tariffs and project viability
caused considerable controversy recently when the CDM’s governing body,
the Executive Board (“CDM EB”), clashed with Chinese interests over de-
termining whether specific projects were eligible for the subsidies.343 A
339 Zeppezauer & Carnabuci, supra note 82 (“It is usually intended for renewable energy
generation projects in China to be recognized and registered as Clean Development
Mechanism projects . . . . This has been of particular relevance for wind power generation
projects.”).
340 E-mail from Alexander U. Conrad, Principal & Managing Director, emidaASIA, to Joel
B. Eisen, Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law (Nov. 2, 2009, 3:21 PM)
(on file with author).
341 JOANNA I. LEWIS, ENERGY FOUND. CHINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY PROGRAM, THE
EVOLVING ROLE OF CARBON FINANCE IN PROMOTING RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
IN CHINA 16 (2009) available at http://www.climateworks.org/download/?id=506d9e9f
-65c9-4a09-b12a-9f979bede0a8.
Renewable energy projects typically have a proportionally higher share
of initial investment compared with conventional power generation proj-
ects. In addition, at the time at which the investment decision associated
with the renewable energy project is made, there will most likely still
be uncertainty associated with CDM project approval. As a result, the
revenue from the CERs cannot necessarily be relied upon in the early
stages of developing a project.
Id.
342 Id. at 16.
[W]hile the CDM could help tip a project that is on the borderline of
being profitable towards profitability, this is unlikely to be a sufficient
factor for determining whether to invest in the first place. Wind energy
projects require a sizable upfront investment and take many years to
yield sizable carbon reductions; therefore it is estimated that total CDM
revenue will likely contribute less than 10 percent of the total project
investment cost.
Id.
343 Id. at 14–15 (observing that “the CDM Executive Board has highlighted 15 wind projects
in China that must be reviewed due to inconsistencies in the documentation of the level
of government subsidy or feed-in tariff”).
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complex process established under procedures of the CDM EB determines
project eligibility.344 Once a project has been approved by the NDRC, which
is the “Designated National Authority” for China,345 and registered with
the CDM EB, the CERs yielded by that project can be sold or traded.346
Each project sponsor must prepare a document that explains in detail how
its future emissions reductions will be voluntary, real, additional, and
will not induce leakage.347
This process has come under considerable fire for relying on
“additionality”: a determination that project emissions reductions will
add to those already likely to occur.348 This in turn requires a baseline pro-
jection of emissions that would have occurred without the subsidy provided
by the CDM.349 As commentators have noted, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to prove the “counterfactual” that emissions reductions would not have
happened but for the CDM’s subsidy.350 In his study of the CDM, Professor
Michael Wara notes that in China’s electricity sector “projects present
extremely challenging regulatory decisions to the CDM EB because it must
decide which projects would or would not have gone forward without the
carbon finance funds.”351 He concludes that “the incentives created by the
CDM are likely leading to no change in behavior except for widespread
claims for credits.”352
344 These procedures may be found at the website of the CDM EB. EB Meetings, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/index.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2010).
345 Designated National Authorities, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/view.html?CID=46 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010); EU-CHINA CDM
FACILITATION PROJECT, supra note 335, at 21 (flow chart showing this information).
346 About CDM, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://cdm.unfccc
.int/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
347 Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and
Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1770 (2008).
348 Id. at 1770–71. For other discussions of additionality, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN
UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM (2008). See generally Steven Ferrey, When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The
New Math of Legal “Additionality” Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation,
10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 591 (2009).
349 Wara, supra note 347, at 1771.
350  Id. at 1769. Professor Wara claims that this and other deficiencies of the current CDM
system are “leading to widespread strategic behavior” to game the system. Id. at 1797.
351 Id. at 1790. A European study agrees, noting that “wrestling with issues related to
‘additionality’ in the context of a rapidly changing landscape of Chinese Climate and
Energy policy add[s] a layer of complexity to discussions of future rules on CDM or
equivalent.” EU-CHINA CDM FACILITATION PROJECT, supra note 335, at 28.
352 Wara, supra note 347, at 1798.
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A comprehensive analysis of the CDM is beyond the scope of
this article, and Professor Wara does not specifically address renewable
energy projects. However, his claim does appear to be supported by the
available evidence, at least with respect to wind power projects. The CDM
EB has historically rejected few CDM projects proposed for China.353
That can be seen either as reflecting good vetting of proposed projects at
the national level, or as a simple reluctance to reject subsidy requests. It
defies credulity to claim all projects would not have happened but for the
availability of subsidies.354 That claim is easily refuted by the govern-
mental activity described throughout this article. China is actively devel-
oping laws and policies, putting in place financial incentives and tariffs,
and taking other steps to promote renewables.355 That makes it difficult
to say that no proposed project would go forward without an extra inter-
national subsidy.356
This issue came to the fore in 2009, when the CDM EB ques-
tioned whether six Chinese wind projects should be included in the
CDM.357 The CDM EB called for more information on the new wind tar-
iffs in China, which it intended to use to decide whether the proposed
projects were additional.358 Industry representatives called the decision
“unsupported by evidence and taken behind closed doors,”359 and criticized
353 EU-CHINA CDM FACILITATION PROJECT, supra note 335, at 21; LEWIS, supra note 341,
at 15 (“[O]nly 7 renewable energy CDM projects (one wind project and six hydropower
projects) have been rejected by the executive board due to additionality concerns.”). This,
of course, changed with the recent announcement that six wind projects would be rejected.
See infra notes 354–60 and accompanying text.
354 LEWIS, supra note 341, at 14 (“If a host country already has policies in place to promote
renewable energy (e.g. a feed-in tariff subsidy or a mandatory RPS), for example, then
it could be hard to prove that the project wouldn’t have occurred without the CDM.”).
355 See supra Part III. See generally Shai Oster, Chinese Law Aims to Increase the Use of
Renewable Energy, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ
_PUB:SB126192809041606467.html.
356 LEWIS, supra note 341, at 14 (noting, for example, that “[t]he existence of a direct sub-
sidy, such as a feed-in tariff, apparently can be used to question the financial additionality
calculation of a project”).
357 See Karl-Erik Stromsta, CDM Approves 32 Chinese Wind Farms; Rejects Six Others,
RECHARGE (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.rechargenews.com/energy/wind/article206525
.ece (discussing the decisions).
358 EXEC. BD. OF THE CLEAN DEV. MECHANISM, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CDM-EB-51, FIFTY-FIRST MEETING, REPORT VERSION 01.1, at 14–16 (2009),
available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/051/eb51rep.pdf (this report describes the findings
of the CDM EB with respect to these projects); see also Stromsta, supra note 357 (discussing
the decisions).
359 Blown Right Off Course? CDM Executive Board Turns Against Renewable Energy
Development, GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL (Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.gwec.net/index
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it as arbitrary.360 This discussion is but one of many that suggest that
there should be a sustained effort to determine what form the CDM will
take after 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period ends.361
That discussion, of course, is in turn one aspect of a much more complex
set of international negotiations about a follow-on treaty to the Kyoto
Protocol. At present, “the insecurity surrounding post 2012 developments
pose[s] a significant risk to investments in the CDM market,”362 and it re-
mains unclear what form the post-2012 subsidy regime will take. Resolv-
ing this set of issues will continue to be vitally important to the continued
development of China’s renewable energy industry.
D. Protectionism and Quality Concerns About China’s Domestic
Renewables Equipment Manufacturing Industry
As numerous press reports indicate, China is intent on developing
its domestic renewables industries.363 This was an explicit goal of the
Medium and Long-Term Development Plan, which stated that “[b]y 2020,
a relatively complete renewable energy technology and industry system
will have been established, so that a domestic manufacturing capability
based mainly on China’s own IPRs will have been established, satisfying
the needs for deploying renewable energy on a large scale in China.”364
The industry situation is changing rapidly, as domestic companies have
matured into major enterprises capable of competing with the foreign
.php?id=30&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=235&tx_ttnews[backPid]=4&cHash=
00b98ea04d.
360 See, e.g.,CDM: Questions About Chinese Wind Power Projects, IETA NEWSLETTER (Int’l
Emissions Trading Ass’n, Geneva, Switz.), July 2009, http://ymlp.com/zfLyC9.
A flood of questions about the additionality of Chinese wind power
projects due to some changes in government tariff rates over the past
few years has led to a rather sudden and increasingly burdensome string
of questions from the Secretariat and the CDM Executive Board that
IETA has argued are both inappropriate procedurally and which, when
answered as requested, still do not affect the additionality determination.
Id.
361 See generally LEWIS, supra note 341.
362 EU-CHINA CDM FACILITATION PROJECT, supra note 335, at 51.
363 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Drawing Critics, China Seeks to Dominate in Renewable
Energy, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at B1; Press Release, Jennifer Cummings, Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, New Study Details Chinese Government Polices to Promote Domestic
Renewable Energy Sector & Implications for Foreign Firms (Mar. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?id=236&mode=View&articleid=3015.
364 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan, supra note 61, at 5.
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manufacturers who once dominated the field.365 According to the NDRC,
there are now more than seventy wind power equipment manufacturers,
up from six in 2004.366 One Chinese researcher confidently predicts that
“[a]fter 5 years to 10 years’ efforts, China will be not only the powerful
country on wind power equipment manufacturing, but also the important
country of [sic] exporting wind power equipment.”367
Unfortunately, as with everything about renewable energy in
China, simplistic statistics showing spectacular growth in the equipment
manufacturing industry do not paint the full picture. There are continu-
ing questions about whether China’s domestic industry can provide quality
products to support a rapid increase in deployment of renewable energy
technology.368 As recently as 2009, one observer noted “[w]ind-turbine
manufacturers and wind-farm developers everywhere have faced teeth-
ing problems, but China has perhaps faced more difficulties than most.
Its wind farms are much less efficient than those in other leading coun-
tries [and] manufacturing defects have plagued Chinese equipment.”369
Another notes that Chinese wind turbines are less expensive but appear
to have traded cost for some quality.370 It may well be that industry growth
and experience will yield better results in the near term, but one cannot
be sure.
Encouraging a vibrant domestic renewables industry brings charges
that a protectionist China is competing unfairly with other nations.371 This
365 See Lim, supra note 92. The article points out that “[d]omestic players who once relied
on joint ventures with foreign partners, are now poised to stand alone with sufficient in-
house technology and expertise.” Id.
366 Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88.
367 Dexin, supra note 77, at 35.
368 See generally JAVIER CAMPILLO & STEPHEN FOSTER, DEPT. OF PUB. TECH, MALARDALEN
UNIVERSITY, SWEDEN, GLOBAL SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC INDUSTRY ANALYSIS WITH FOCUS ON
THE CHINESE MARKET (2008), available at www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:127961/
FULLTEXT01 (discussing a litany of challenges facing the Chinese PV manufacturing
industry).
369 Cyranoski, infra note 379, at 372.
370 Lim, supra note 92. “Chinese-made turbines cost up to 20% less than those of multi-
national manufacturers. However, field data suggests that Chinese turbines significantly
lag foreign products in quality, to the extent that the long-term revenue sacrificed from
lower quality (as measured by turbine capacity factor) outweighs the upfront cost savings.”
Id.
371 See Keith Johnson, Protectionist Breezes: Wind-Power Companies Cry Foul on China,
WALL ST. J. ENVTL. CAPITAL BLOG (May 28, 2009, 12:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
environmentalcapital/2009/05/28/protectionist-breezes-wind-power-companies-cry-foul
-on-china; China Uses Every Protectionist Policy Available to Build a Globally Dominant
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has become a major focus of U.S.-China relations over the past year.372 In
October 2010, The U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) launched an
investigation into subsidies in China’s renewable energy industries,
citing “export restraints, prohibited subsidies, discrimination against
foreign companies and imported goods, technology transfer requirements,
and domestic subsidies causing serious prejudice to U.S. interests.”373 What
some view as a potential threat posed by a growing Chinese greentech
industry was no better exemplified by the political storm over the pro-
posed U.S.-China joint wind farm venture in Texas.374 The announcement
that a Chinese firm might supply wind power equipment in the United
States elicited some harsh criticism from members of Congress who
claimed the project would hurt domestic companies.375
At the same time, some in the United States claim that while
Chinese manufacturers are rushing to cash in on increasing American
demand for renewable energy technology, the Chinese government is keep-
ing foreign manufacturers out of its own domestic market.376 Officially,
the Chinese government encourages investment by foreign companies in
this sector and the NDRC and Ministry of Commerce (“MoC”) have pub-
lished a “Guiding Industry Catalogue for Foreign Investment” that iden-
tifies constructing and operating renewable energy projects as “encouraged
industries” for foreign investment.377 In 2009, however, the NDRC, MoF,
Renewable Energy Industry, ALLBUSINESS.COM (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.allbusiness
.com/government/government-bodies-offices-us-federal-government/14441360-1.html.
372 See ALLBUSINESS.COM, supra note 371.
373 United States Trade Representative, supra note 24; Sewell Chan & Keith Bradsher,
U.S. to Investigate China’s Clean Energy Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www
.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/business/16wind.html.
374 See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer, Casey, Brown & Tester
Urge Obama Administration to Suspend Stimulus Program Funneling Billions of Dollars
Overseas (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=322732&
(detailing efforts by four senators to block federal funding for the project).
375 See, e.g., id. China is not the only foreign country accused of taking over the wind power
equipment industry and taking advantage of federal funds from the 2009 ARRA stimulus
package. See generally Russ Choma, Foreign Firms Dominate Wind Energy in U.S., Land
Stimulus Dollars, POLITICS DAILY (May 25, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/
25/foreign-firms-dominate-wind-energy-in-u-s/ (discussing efforts of European firms partici-
pating in American projects).
376 See Johnson, supra note 371.
377 China’s 2007 Foreign Investment Guide, CHINA BUS. REV. http://www.chinabusiness
review.com/public/0801/cmi.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). The English translation of
this provision may be found at Guiding Industry Catalogue for Foreign Investment, FDI,
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=87372 (last visited Oct. 20,
2010) (listing “[c]onstruction and management of new energy power plants (solar energy,
wind energy, magnetic energy, geothermal energy, tidal wave energy, biological mass
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and MoC removed import subsidies and excluded polysilicon and wind
turbines over two MW from a List of Encouraged Imported Technologies
and Technology Products.378 Until 2010, a major barrier remained in place
to foreign investment in the wind power sector. A local content regulation
required that seventy percent of wind turbine components be locally made
and that the wind turbine generator be assembled in China.379 The aim
of this requirement was to encourage China’s technology and manufac-
turing industry for wind turbines.380 This goal has been met very quickly.
In 2004, the market share of domestic companies in China was far lower
than that of multinational turbine manufacturers,381 but now it greatly
exceeds that of foreign companies.382
Numerous foreign observers reported that the domestic content
requirement and the lack of transparency in bidding on individual projects
contribute to a difficult climate for foreign investment in domestic proj-
ects.383 For example, several wind turbine manufacturers attempted to
comply with the local content regulations by building facilities in China to
assemble components there.384 Still, they complain that even those firms
energy, etc.)” among encouraged industries). The China Environmental Law site maintains
an unofficial translation of this document, which confirms the listing. NRDC, CATALOGUE
OF INDUSTRY GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 31 (2007), available at http://www
.chinaenvironmentallaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/guidance-catalogue-for-foreign
-investment-2007.pdf.
378 Qiyan, Wind Power Dilemma, supra note 88.
379 Joanna I. Lewis, Part of the Climate Change Problem . . . and the Solution? Chinese-
Made Wind Power Technology and Opportunities for Dissemination, BRESLAUER SYMPOSIUM,
UNIV. OF CALIF. INT’L AND AREA STUDIES 8 (2005), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/8rt4q01k [hereinafter Lewis, Part of the Climate Change Problem] (discussing the
development of local content requirements.) “Developers bidding on the most recent con-
cession projects in September 2004 had to demonstrate the ability to utilize wind power
technology that met a 70% local content requirement, while the first two projects required
only 50% local content.” Id. at 9. See generally David Cyranoski, Beijing’s Windy Bet,
NATURE, Jan. 22, 2009, at 372, available at http://www.nature.com/news/2009/210109/
full/457372a.html (discussing issues arising from China’s increased use of wind energy).
380 Lewis, Part of the Climate Change Problem, supra note 379, at 7.
381 Id. at 4 fig. 1. In 2004, the only major Chinese company in the wind turbine market
was Goldwind, with a twenty-four percent market share. Id.
382 Lim, supra note 92 (chart “Wind Turbine Generator Market Share in China-Domestic
vs. Foreign”). The drop is indeed rapid. One article estimates that foreign manufacturers
accounted for a seventy-five percent share of equipment in renewable energy projects in
2004, and that share may fall as low as five percent in 2010. U.S. Urges China to Keep
an Open Tech Policy, CNET GREEN TECH (May 15, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128
_3-20005079-54.html.
383 See Johnson, supra note 371.
384 Lewis, Part of the Climate Change Problem, supra note 379, at 9.
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that attempt to comply with the rules are often shut out of projects.385 One
Chinese researcher notes that “multinational manufacturers were dis-
qualified on technical grounds within three days of bidding for wind farm
contracts this spring, even as Chinese companies that had never built a
turbine were approved.”386 The same researcher claims that the government
banned virtually any installation of wind turbines with a capacity of less
than 1000 kW, which would exclude the popular 850-kW designs of
European manufacturers.387 The head of a company based in India stated,
“I cannot say it’s deliberate, but the facts show that no turbine suppliers
from international companies established here have been selected.”388
A full examination of the impact of this issue on U.S.-China trade
relations would be welcome. At the start of the 2010 trade mission to China
to persuade the Chinese to buy American products, Secretary of Commerce
Gary Locke stated, “China, given the incredible challenges that is has,
should in my view be taking the best technology from wherever—whether
it’s China, the United States, Europe, Japan, anywhere else.”389 However,
the USTR investigation has increased tension between the two nations390
and contributed to a much less harmonious trade climate. It has also linked
competition in greentech directly to much larger issues involving the eco-
nomic relationship between the United States and China, such as concerns
over currency manipulation.391 For now, it is unclear whether the Chinese
domestic market will eventually be more open to foreign technology. As
China pursues the growth of its own domestic renewable energy equip-
ment manufacturing industry and implements the programs and policies
described in this article, the answer may become clearer over time.
CONCLUSION
The factors behind China’s “hyper-growth” in the renewable energy
sector “have significant, and somewhat controversial, implications for
385 See Ruonan Zheng, China Builds High Wall to Guard Energy Industry, CHINA WIND
POWER CTR. (July 15, 2009), http://www.cwpc.cn/cwpc/en/node/5829.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Specter of Investment Protectionism Stalks China, REUTERS, June 8, 2009, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5571D320090608.
389 U.S. Urges China to Keep an Open Tech Policy, supra note 382.
390 Mark Drajem & Huang Zhe, China Says U.S. Trade Complaint on Clean Energy Policy
is ‘Irresponsible,’ BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2010, 2:58 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-10-16/china-says-u-s-trade-complaint-on-clean-energy-policy-is-irresponsible-.html
(China’s Ministry of Commerce calls the complaint “groundless” and “irresponsible.”).
391 Id.
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China, global energy players, and the worldwide energy market.”392 Is
China about to lead the world in deploying renewable energy technology?
One would be tempted to say that the answer is an unqualified “yes,” but
the reality is that substantial challenges remain. China’s government
has taken strong measures to promote rapid growth of renewable energy
technologies, but implementation lags behind the officially announced
policies. My hope is that a richer understanding of this landscape will
illustrate how China may succeed at turning to greentech to help satisfy
its increasing demand for energy. In addition, this analysis will also prove
useful to those interested in addressing climate change and improving
relations between our two nations, because the reality of China’s renewable
energy deployment to date is much more nuanced than one would surmise
from any juggernaut-like descriptions of China’s progress.
392 Lim, supra note 92.
